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CHAPTER I
Introduction
The property tax is one of the primary sources of
tax revenue in the United States. In the fiscal year
ending in 1967, it accounted for over $26 billion of tax
revenue. Thus, the property tax collected only a few
billion dollars less than the federal corporation income
tax. Moreover, it was the most important single source
of total state and local tax revenue. For local govern-
ments alone, the property tax is even more important. In
fact, the property tax produced over 87% of all local
government tax revenue in fiscal 1967.2
Among the major sources of tax revenue, the prop-
erty tax is unique with respect to the process by which
effective tax rates are established. Effective personal
income tax rates and corporation income tax rates are
products of the legislative process, and thus, for these
two taxes the various exemptions, deductions, and rate
1The federal corporation income tax collected $31
billion in the fiscal year ending in 1967. Economic Re-
port of the President, Transmitted to the Congress
January, 1969, Tables B-63 and B-69.
2In Massachusetts, property tax collections are
99% of all local government tax revenues. U. S. Bureau
of Census, Census of Governments: 1967, Vol. 2, "Taxable
Property Values," Table 1.
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schedules are more or less openly determined and explic-
itly written into tax laws. Such is not the case, how-
ever, with respect to the establishment of effective
property tax rates. Effective property tax rates are a
function of both the nominal tax rate and the relation-
ship between assessment levels and market value.1 Al-
though the nominal tax rate, which is the tax as a per
cent of assessed value, is usually decided upon openly
by local governmental units, property tax assessment ad-
ministrators are typically allowed considerable leeway in
establishing assessment-to-market value relationships.
Thus, even though the same nominal tax rate may apply to
all properties within a given tax jurisdiction, the same
effective rate will not apply to all properties if there
is a lack of uniformity in ratios of assessed value to
market value. In effect then, the two decision making
units, one for the nominal tax rate and one for the
1 The definition of the term "effective tax rate"
is
t = t (A/P),n
where A is assessed value, P is market value t is the
nominal tax rate as a percent of $1,000 assessei value,
and t is the effective tax rate as a percent of market
value. Since most of this investigation involves cross-
sectional comparisons in which t is the same in all
areas, the term "assessment-to-sale value ratio" is used
interchangeably with the term "effective tax rate."
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assessment-to-market value ratios, decide different as-
pects of the property tax burden. Nominal tax rate
decisions establish the aggregate tax burdens, and assess-
ment ratio decisions determine the distribution of the
tax burden among property owners.
Thus, unlike any other important source of tax
revenue, a considerable degree of power over effective
property tax rate determination is placed in the hands of
authorities, assessment administrators, whose decisions
are not well publicized and who are usually not directly
accountable to the electorate. Admittedly, there is some
public control over assessment administration through
statewide tax-equilization boards which exist in some
places, e.g., California. However, in most areas public
control is weak, especially with respect to the adminis-
tration of assessments within local property tax juris-
dictions. This situation is clearly true in the city of
Boston, where this study is undertaken.
Given this process of effective rate determination,
it is not surprising that the property tax is frequently
criticized from the standpoint of horizontal equity.1 If
market value is the standard of equity, then variations
in effective property tax rates obviously violate the
1Dick Netzer, Economics of the Property Tax,
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1966),
p. 165.
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principle of horizontal equity. On the other hand, if
income is the standard of equity. then even if effective
tax rates were the same for all members of the community,
equals would not be taxed equally. The correlation be-
tween income and property market value is far from per-
fect. Moreover, with respect to renters there is the
additional question of tax shifting. In fact, it is
possible that variations in effective tax rates actually
improve horizontal income equity. Nevertheless, regard-
less of the particular standard of equity, the property
tax is unique in that there exists such loose control over
factors which have important effects on tax equity.
Several empirical studies of effective property
tax rates have shown that extensive variation does in
fact exist. Frederick L. Bird analyzed assessment ratio
data from the 1957 Census of Governments and concluded
that within selected tax jurisdictions the situation
"....is one of an almost incredibly wide range of adminis-
trative performance."2 By examining the dispersion in
assessment-to-market value ratios around the median ratio,
Bird judged that only 1/5 of the areas selected displayed
at least "good" quality assessment practices. The assess-
U. S. Bureau of Census' Census of Housing: 1960,
Vol. 11, "Metropolitan Housing," Part 1, Table 13-4.
2Frederick L. Bird, The General Property' Tax:
Findings of the 1957 Census *of 'Goerents (PulicAdmin-
istration Service, 1960), p. 55.
Perhaps the most detailed study of variations in
effective tax rates within a given tax jurisdiction is
that by Oliver Oldman and Henry Aaron. 3 By grouping a
large sample of properties from the city of Boston accord-
ing to property type, location, and market value, Aaron
and Oldman were able to examine the variation in assess-
ment-to-market value ratios in each grouping. They
1U. S. Bureau of Census, Census of Governments:
1967, Vol. 2, "Taxable Property Values," Table 19.
2C. W. Meyer, "Geographic Inequalities in Property
Taxes in Iowa, 1962," National Tax Journal, Dec. 1965,
p. 388.
30. Oldman and H. Aaron, "Assessment-Sales Ratios
under the Boston Property Tax," National Tax Journal,
March 1965, Vol. XVIII, pp. 36-49.
ment quality in another 1/5 of the areas was considered
to be "unbelievably poor." The 1967 Census of Governments
indicates that the data on which Bird based his conclu-
sions has not changed substantially since 1957.1
Charles W. Meyer also examined variations in
effective tax rates.2 However, because Meyer compared
effective tax rates between different tax jurisdictions,
counties, his findings do not bear on matters related to
intra-jurisdictional assessment administration. In Meyer's
study effective tax rate variations are caused by differ-
ences between counties with respect to the relationship of
local public expenditures to the total market value of
property.
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described their general findings as follows: "How much and
what kinds of unequal treatment exist in Boston? 'Plenty'
and 'many' are the answers indicated by the study, though
the reasons are not always apparent." 1
The present study examines assessment-to-market
value ratios within the city of Boston in even greater
detail than did Oldman and Aaron. One of two objectives
of this study is to attempt to explain why variations in
effective tax rates occur. Oldman and Aaron's results
indicate that in Boston there are "...systematic inconsis-
tencies in property tax assessments... .2 But at the same
time they admit that "...explanations for this pattern
[the observed pattern of effective tax rates] are
obscure." 3 Actually, an attempt to explain the causes of
variation constitutes an attempt to describe the behavior
of assessment administrators. The approach taken in this
study is to test hypotheses about assessment behavior
against the observed pattern of effective rate variations.
The results help to identify the considerations of assess-
ment administrators which can possibly explain the observ-
ed pattern. Also, the results have some bearing on the
question of the extent to which variation is a product of
an intentional assessment policy as opposed to an inadver-
tent policy.
I1 bid., p. 36.
2 Ibid., p. 48.
Ibid., p. 48.
A second objective of this study is to improve on
Oldman's and Aaron's description of the pattern of effec-
tive rate variation in Boston. Even though the reasons
for effective rate variation may not be entirely clear,
it is important to identify how and to what extent rates
vary with respect to location and general housing and
population characteristics. Since the pattern of effec-
tive rate variation will become apparent in the course of
the above mentioned search for possible explanations of
variation in effective tax rates, the study focuses on
this first objective.
Although this study is designed for an examina-
tion of the Boston situation given the available Boston
data, the approach is believed to be sufficiently general
to be useful for performing similar studies of other tax
jurisdictions. Moreover, conclusions of a study based on
Boston data alone are probably not unique to the city of
Boston. Data published in the Census of Governments
suggest that most major cities have assessment systems
which impose widely variable effective tax rates. On the
other hand, only careful examination of each individual
situation can reveal to what extent tax rate variation in
other tax jurisdictions is similar to Boston's and to
what extent the causes of the variation are the same.
More specifically, in Chapter II general aspects
of assessment behavior are discussed, and several hypoth-
eses of assessment objectives are developed. After a
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description of the sources of data in Chapter III, a
model of assessment behavior is specified in Chapter IV.
Results of empirical tests of this model are presented
in Chapters V and VI.
CHAPTER II
Assessment Behavior
Throughout this study it is assumed that assess-
ment behavior is a function of certain objectives of
assessment policy. These objectives are constrained by
the limitations imposed by the assessment mechanism, which
is the process by which assessment policy decisions are
effectively translated into the desired pattern of effec-
tive tax rates. There are several possible methods of
identifying assessment policy objectives and of describing
the assessment mechanism. One way is to examine the
entire assessment process directly by interviewing city
officials. Such an approach is, however, far from satis-
factory. Almost any subject connected with property tax-
ation in Boston is a fairly sensitive political issue,
and, as a result, there is a general reluctance on the
part of city officials to discuss most of the interesting
subjects. Nevertheless, some informal interviews were
conducted. As expected, officials were rather guarded in
their responses, and no conclusive information was ob-
tained. However, the interviews did provide a better
understanding of the assessment mechanism and helped to
shape some of the following hypotheses on assessment be-
havior.
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Another method of determining assessment behavior
is to infer assessment behavior from the performance of
the assessment system. The general pattern of observable
effective tax rates can be used to test hypotheses on
assessment behavior. Unfortunately, this procedure also
has its shortcoming. Given the available data, it may not
be possible to distinguish clearly between alternative
hypotheses. Nevertheless, the second procedure is the
one employed in this study.
Three basically different assessment behavior
hypotheses are discussed in the following pages. Each
hypothesis attempts to explain how cross-sectional varia-
tion in effective tax rates can occur. To summarize
briefly, the first hypothesis is that assessment policy
is intentionally discriminatory with respect to certain
cross-sectional variables. The second hypothesis holds
that the assessor's only goal is to estimate the market
value of properties and thus to assess all properties in
an equal proportion to their market value. Under these
conditions effective tax rate variation is inadverte.nt and
is attributed to systematic and random errors in market
value estimation. The third hypothesis is that because of
time lags in the assessment mechanism, desired assessment
policies, whatever they may be, cannot be immediately
instituted.
A. Assessment Discrimination
The first of several explanations given in this
study for the existence of cross-sectional variation in
effective tax rates is that the variation is a deliberate
result of a discriminatory assessment policy. This hypoth-
esis holds that it is by no means a mistake that prop-
erties are assessed nonuniformly with respect to the ratio
of assessed value to market value. The general pattern of
effective tax rates which exists within the city is de-
signed by the assessment administration according to cer-
tain policy objectives. The following discussion suggests
three possible objectives of a discriminatory assessment
policy.
Benefit Principle
With respect to the property tax, property value
itself is the most obvious standard of equity. Moreover,
property value is the legally established norm in Massachu-
setts. Nevertheless, there is a general tendency on the
part of policy-makers to compromise the importance of
property value as a standard of equity. The strong possi-
bility exists that, instead of following a property value
standard, the assessor resorts to a benefit principle of
1Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 343 Mass.
223, 178 N.E. 2d 10 (1961); and see Part II, Ch. 1, sec. 1,
art. 4 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts, as well as Mass. G.L. (Ter. Ed.), Ch. 59, Sec. 38.
taxation. These two standards are, of course, usually at
odds because of the fact that property value is not gener-
ally a good indicator of benefits received. Public
service benefits accrue in large part to individuals and
not to property.
Given that the assessor does consider the property
tax to be at least in part a benefit tax, what objective
criteria might he use for distributing the tax burden on
this basis? First of all, the level of public expenditures
is a frequently used measure of benefits received, and
there is intra-jurisdictional variation in public expendi-
tures for services such as education, welfare, and police
and fire protection. Educational expenditures vary large-
ly according to population density. Welfare costs and
police protection are both usually higher in slum neighbor-
hoods.2 Although no explicit accounting of the distribution
of these expenditures exists, there is a prevailing con-
sensus among city officials as to the general distribution
of city expenditures.
1Dick Netzer, Economics of the Property Tax, p. 5.
2The distribution of fire protection expenditures
is not clear. The probability of fire is greater in
crowded neighborhoods. But in less crowded areas where
fires are less likely to occur, the buildings are more
spread out tending to increase the cost of fire protection
per capita.
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Another type of benefit criteria may be based on
property type. Population density per $1,000 of property
value usually increases with the number of families living
in a single structure. Thus, effective tax rates may be
positively related to the number of families per structure
because of an effort to maintain a constant absolute tax
bill on a per family or per capita basis.
A final type of benefit criteria may influence
intra-neighborhood assessment decisions among properties
of the same type. Whereas public service benefits may
vary substantially across the city, they probably vary
much less within small subdivisions of the city. And,
even though they do vary somewhat within small areas, it
is unlikely that the assessor attempts to discriminate be-
tween individual properties within the same neighborhood
on the basis of benefits received. In fact, he probably
assumes that, with respect to neighboring properties of
the same type, potential public service benefits are equal.
As a result, one of his goals may be to establish within
each property class a pattern of effective tax rates which
yield relatively uniform tax burdens in terms of annual
tax bills. (Of course, given variations in property value,
effective tax rates which yield uniform tax bills will not
themselves be uniform.)
lProperty types are distinguished by the number of
families per structure, e.g., single-family, two-family,
etc..
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The assessor's application of this last benefit
criterion is probably motivated not .so much by devotion to
benefit principles per se but rather by more practical
considerations. Taxpayers are likely to be more aware of
and concerned about absolute tax bills on neighboring
properties than they are about tax bills on properties in
other neighborhoods or effective tax rates in general.
According to officials in the assessment department, the
motivation of most property tax abatement requests is not
alleged inequities with respect to properties in distant
areas of the city but rather alleged inequities with respect
to properties in the immediate vicinity of the person
making the abatement request. Thus, by striving for
uniform absolute tax bills on neighboring properties, the
assessor reduces taxpayer discontent.
Social Goals
Facing the City of Boston are several interrelated
long-run problems which conceivably motivate the assess-
ment administration to pursue a discriminatory effective
tax rate policy. These problems are not peculiar to
Boston; they exist in many large cities.
Since the War many middle-to-upper income central
city families have been attracted to suburbia. Although
there are several explanations for this middle-to-upper
income population movement, differential tax rates between
the city and the suburbs must be considered a principal
factor. Another important incentive is created by the
urban-suburban difference in the quantity and quality of
public services.
Out-migration of middle-to-upper income families
has caused a downward conversion of the central city hous-
ing stock. Because downward conversion usually involves
an increase in the number of occupants per structure, the
net effect of out-migration and in-migration will be to
tend to increase the total central city population and
therefore also its population density. Moreover, the in-
coming population will be composed primarily of low income
families because low income families typically are demanders
of low quality housing. Thus, with an increase in its
population density, a decrease in the quality of its
housing stock., and an increase in the proportion of low
income families, the central city's cost of providing a
constant level of public services increases as middle-to-
upper income people leave the central city.
Given this situation, the city is forced to cut
back on public service quality and/or raise property tax
rates. Unfortunately, both means of adjustment only fur-
ther aggravate the initial problem. By increasing the
urban-suburban property tax differential and/or the urban-
suburban public service quality differential, middle-to-
upper income families are provided with an even greater
incentive to leave the city. In effect, a vicious circle
develops. Location decisions are based on several factors
which are themselves a function of the location decisions.
In addition, the only stable equilibrium of such a system
would appear to be at the limit where all middle-to-upper
income people have finally left the city, and the city
itself is left with hugh per capita public expenditure
requirements.
Although the discussion to this point has focused
on what is essentially a fiscal problem, there are also
several other problems created by the transformations
which have taken place within the city. For one thing,
the decline in housing quality which has taken place is
not localized in those areas vacated by middle-to-upper
income people. Instead, the decline has been more general,
and therefore the housing conditions in some areas reach
a point where significant neighborhood externalities
develop which are characteristic of a slum situation.
Thus, in addition to a general downward quality conversion
of the central city housing stock, the middle-to-upper
income out-migration also tends to encourage the spread
of slum conditions.
Not to be overlooked is the fact that many of the
city's newer residents are Negroes. Thus, the city's
racial mix has also been changing over the past two
decades as middle-to-upper income families have left
the central city.
In view of the problems of the city, which have
been only briefly described above, there are several
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rational social goals which may influence assessment
policy. First, a central city policy of effective tax
rate competition with the suburbs for middle-to-upper
income families must be a tempting means of halting the
exodus of middle-to-upper income people. It is clear
from discussions with city officials that they are not
only distressed by the continuing exodus of upper and
middle income families from the central city to the sub-
urbs, but that they also believe that assessment policy
decisions can affect family location. Evidence that this
is the case is found when officials are asked why some of
the obvious assessment ratio inconsistencies between high
and low income neighborhoods have been allowed to develop.
The responses inevitably refer to a desire not to encourage
any further movement of upper income families out of the
city.
A slightly different goal from that of trying to
stem the middle-to-upper income migration is that of pro-
moting stability in any "nice" neighborhood regardless of
its average income level. "Nice" neighborhoods are those
characterized by the absence of any of the undesirable
social costs related to slum conditions. In "nice" neigh-
borhoods housing conditions are good, crime rates are low,
and health standards are high. Although the emphasis of
this particular assessment goal is essentially the pre-
vention of slums, the actual pattern of effective tax
rates which is called for probably substantially overlaps
that of the previously discussed goal.
Given the' changing racial mixture of the city, the
assessment administration may also desire to discourage
the exodus of white citizens from the city. This partic-
ular goal is not necessarily motivated by racial prej-
udice. The maintenance of a racially heterogeneous
population may be a desirable goal in itself, although it
is difficult to argue that Boston's less than 10% Negro
population represents a proportion which is greater than
that desired for a health racial balance.
Political Pressures
The administration of the property tax in Boston
is not performed in a politically isolated atmosphere.
Many of the appointments to the assessment department are
political appointments, and much of assessment policy is
worked out between the head of the assessment department
and the Mayor's office. The opportunity for political
pressures to influence assessment policy decisions most
certainly exists.
The specific nature of possible political pres-
sures is difficult to identify without a thorough political
analysis. However, it is possible to suggest several
potential sources of political influence. Although voter
densities appear to be one such source, a large majority
of the residents in densely populated areas are tenants
as opposed to owner occupants, and tenants, as a group,
are not as likely to seekfavorable assessments through
political action as are home owners, as a group. Many
tenants are likely to reason that since the property tax
is paid by the landlord, he is the one who is bearing
most of the burden. Thus, one would expect political
pressures to be greatest in areas of predominantly owner
occupied residences.
Other potential sources of political influence
exist in the several areas of Boston which are rather
homogeneous with respect to either race or nationality.
Most parts of Roxbury exhibit Negro densities of well over
50%. Much of East Boston is about 30% occupied by citizens
of Italian nationality. There is also a strong Irish
community in Boston although it is not as concentrated as
either of the other two groups.
The actual effect of these ethnic and racial groups
on effective tax rates is likely to vary considerably. From
casual observation of Boston politics,it is clear that both
the Italian and the Irish communities are effective polit-
ical forces. On the other hand, the Negro community
appears to have had little voice in the political process
until recently.
B. Mis-estimation of Market Value
The previous hypothesis argued that effective tax
rate variation is the intentional result of discriminatory
assessment behavior. An opposing hypothesis is that
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discrimination is inadvertent; the only objective of
assessment policy is to assess according to market value,
an objective which would seem to be consistent with
Massachusetts law.' A further aspect of this hypothesis
is that the assessor possesses imperfect knowledge of
property market value and therefore must estimate market
value. In fact, under this hypothesis, the errors in the
estimation of market value are the key to the pattern of
effective tax rates.
Assessment errors resulting from the mis-estimation
of market value can be of two general types -- random or
systematic. However, if the errors were only of the first
type, it is impossible to explain by this hypothesis the
obvious systematic pattern of effective tax rates which are
revealed by a preliminary study of the data. Although it
is inevitable that random errors do occur, it is clear that
the present hypothesis must be based on the supposition
that systematic errors are made in the estimation of market
value. Thus, the discussion turns to a brief examination
of the determinants of residential property market value.
Property value depends on at least two distin-
guishable factors: the characteristics of the specific
piece of property and the characteristics of the neighbor-
hood in which the property is located. With respect to
1See footnote 1, p. 20.
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the specific piece of property, various physical charac-
teristics are, of course, important, e.g., the size of the
structure, the age and state of repair of the structure,
and the size of the lot. The location of the dwelling
with respect to centers of employment opportunities and
retail activity also influences the value of the specific
property.
Neighborhood characteristics are also a determi-
nantof property value because of the many important exter-
nalities which are inherent in the provision of housing
services. The quality of one housing unit is a function
not only of the quality of that particular housing unit
but also of certain characteristics of neighboring housing
units, such as their state of repair. In addition to
other residential buildings, a neighborhood consists of
many potential sources of neighborhood amenities such as
commercial establishments, parks, schools, and police and
fire protection. Some neighborhood amenities may also be
related to intangible factors involving general neighbor-
hood social conditions.
Thus, a correct estimation of market value requires
the consideration of many factors, some of which may be
rather difficult to evaluate, especially the influence of
neighborhood externalities. In fact, the assessor may
choose to largely ignore neighborhood externalities and
base his assessment only on the characteristics of the
property itself. It is probably much easier to defend
assessments which are founded on objective rules of thumb
pertaining to obvious physical characteristics of proper-
ties than it is to defend subjective evaluations of
neighborhood amenities.
If the assessor does confine his estimation to a
consideration of only the objective characteristics of
properties, it is clear that errors in estimation will be
made. However, unlike random errors, these errors are
very likely to be systematic. For example, market value
will tend to be overestimated in all areas where signifi-
cant negative neighborhood externalities exist, and,
therefore, effective tax rates will tend to be higher in
these areas. This type of assessment error would create
a pattern of differential effective tax rates which would
be a function of the distribution of various neighborhood
externalities.
It is possible that in addition to neighborhood
externality errors, assessors may also make systematic
errors in the evaluation of individual property character-
istics. Given that a strictly objective approach is
followed, the rules of thumb which are used in the calcu-
lations may be biased. For example, for each property
land may be weighted too heavily in the estimation process.
As a result, properties with large lots would tend to be
assessed higher than those with smaller lots,, and a
definite pattern of effective tax rates would exist among
areas of the city which are dominated by properties with
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different lot sizes. This example, however, is only a
conjecture used for illustrative purposes. The probable
nature of this type of assessment error cannot be deter-
mined a priori; it can only be argued that the possi-
bility for this type of error exists and that it may
cause systematic effective tax rate biases.
C. Assessment Lags
Any pattern of effective tax rates which is deter-
mined by assessment policy goals may not be perfectly con-
sistent with the actual pattern of effective tax rates. In
order to maintain any given pattern of effective tax rates,
it is necessary to adjust continuously assessments to
changing market values. However, continuous assessment
adjustment, or anything close to it, is very unlikely
given a limited assessment budget. Thus, it is reasonable
to suppose that, regardless of what the assessment objec-
tives may be, a time lag in the assessment process causes
the observed pattern of effective tax rates to be differ-
ent from that which is determined by the assessment ob-
jectives. A more precise specification of this hypothesis
immediately follows.
It is assumed that for any property the discrepancy
between the actual effective tax rate and the desired
effective tax rate is some function of the percentage
change in market value, AP/P. This relationship can be
written as
(At /Pt) - (At /Pt) d (AP/P).
The left-hand side of this expression represents the
difference between actual and desired assessment-to-market
value ratios, where these ratios are directly proportional
to corresponding effective tax rates. 2 The superscript
"d" identifies the desired assessment-to-market value
ratio. On the right-hand side of the above equation,
AP/P is the percentage change in market value or price. 3
Alsoon the right-hand side the term 8 is the ratio of the
difference between actual and desired assessment ratios to
the percentage change in prices. Furthermore, <  0. A
situation where 8 = 0 implies that there is perfect
adjustment of actual to desired effective tax rates. The
minimum value of 8, which indicates a complete lack of
adjustment of assessments to changing prices, depends on
the size of the stationary assessment and on the level of
"Desired effective tax rate" means the effective
tax rate which is determined by assessment policy. Strict-
ly speaking, if this tax rate is a result of assessment
errors, it is not intentional, and therefore "desired" is
not a very accurate description of it. However, for sim-
plicity the expression "desired" will be used with the
above qualification.
2See footnote 1, page 11.
3The exact definition of AP/P which will be used
is (Pt~ t-1 +Pt-1)/2).
prices before and after the price change.
By adding (At t d to both sides of the ab.ove(A/t to. afntino
equation, it is clear that At t is a function of a
change in market price and the desired assessment-to-market
value ratio, i.e.,
d
(II.1) (At/t) = gAP/P + (A t /Pt)
In equation (II.1) notice that a = 0 implies (A t /Pt)
d(A t /Pt). Also, < 0 and (AP/P)> 0 implies (At /Pt
(At /Pt) d, and a < 0, (AP/P) < 0 implies (At /Pt
d(A t /Pt)
lAt time t = 0 let prices and assessments equal
P0 and AO, respectively. At a later time, t = 1, let
prices and assessments equal P1 and A1 , respectively.
The minimum value of a occurs when there is no adjustment
of assessment, i.e., when A0 = A . Also, if it is
assumed that the desired assessment ratio equals the
actual assessment ratio at t = 0, i.e., (A /P0 )d = (A0 1
then
(A /P1) - (A0/P 0)
amin (P1-P 0 )/((P 1+P 0)/2)'
Simplifying, the above yields
A. m P1+P0 )
5min 2P 1P0
The assessment lag hypothesis can be refined some-
what by supposing that the assessor's speed of adjustment
to changing market conditions is a function of the frequen-
cy of market transactions. One would expect the assessor
to recognize price changes more quickly in areas where
there is more market activity and therefore more observable
sale prices. This assumption can be written as
a = f(F), W3/aF>0,
where F is a measure of transaction frequency. Furthermore,
it is also assumed that the function f is linear and that
the relationship can be written as
(11.2) a = a0 + F,
where a0 < 0 and 6 > 0, and because 6 < 0, a F < I0I1.
The above equation and the conditions imposed on it
indicate that although the total speed of response, a,
may be reduced by quicker recognition, a > 0, there may
still be a lag between recognition and actual assessment
adjustments, a0 < 0. Substitution of equation (11.2) into
equation (II.1) yields the following:
d(11.3) (At/Pt) = aO(AP/P) + aIF(AP/P) + (A t /Pt)
1The dimensionality of a is the difference between
actual and desired assessment raiios divided by percentage
price change t'imes transactions frequency units.
It is clear from (11.3) that the assessment lag
hypothesis is consistent with either of the previous two
hypotheses. In fact it is even consistent with the suppo-
sition that the assessor's one objective is to estimate
market value and that he does so accurately. The fact
that the actual effective tax rates do not appear to be
consistent with such a hypothesis may simply be due to
lags in the assessment mechanism.
D. Overview of Empirical Tests of Assessment Behavior
Hypotheses
Empirical tests of the hypotheses presented in
this chapter are complicated by the general lack of data
on the various assessment objectives which are suggested.
For example, quantification of the somewhat vague "social
goals" is probably impossible. Useful data on the dis-
tribution of public service benefits within the city could
not be collected without considerable time and effort.
However, some measures of neighborhood externalities do
exist., and there are also several available measures of
interesting neighborhood characteristics.
Thus, because the possibility of direct testing
of hypotheses is limited, this study relies on evidence
which can be obtained through more or less indirect
testing. Although variables which explain part of the
variation in effective tax rates may not be policy objec-
tives in themselves, their logical association with policy
objectives provides useful information. Moreover, some of
the clear patterns which are shown by effective tax rate
data may in themselves be highly suggestive.
The primary statistical tool used in this study
is ordinary least squares regression analysis. It is
applied to two different models explaining effective tax
rate variation. The most useful model is that which ex-
plainsinter-neighborhood variations. The other model
explains variations among individual properties. Both
models provide a framework within which assessment be-
havior hypotheses can be tested. Furthermore, effective
tax rate variation among property classes,including new
constructionis examined by straightforward inspection
of effective tax rate patterns.
The nature of the data which are available for this
study imposes some limits on the development of assessment
models. Therefore, before these models are discussed, a
description of the data and of the nature of the data
sample is presented.
CHAPTER III
The Data and the Nature of the Sample
A. Data Sources
City of Boston data were used in the study for
reasons of locational convenience and data availability.
In 1960 the city of Boston had a total population of
696,000; metropolitan Boston's population was 2,589,000
in 1960. Like most local governmental units, the city of
Boston is heavily dependent on property tax revenue. With
respect to effective property tax rates, the city of
Boston has one of the highest in the U. S.. The 1967
Census of Governments indicates that among the 182 major
metropolitan areas selected for study only eight had
effective property tax rates on single-family properties
higher than Boston's 3.01%. Ninety-two of the selected
areas, including New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, had
effective tax rates of 2.0% or less.1
The body of data which was collected especially
for this study is on individual parcels of residential
1U. S. Bureau of Census, Census of Governments:
1967, Vol. 2, "Taxable Property Values," Table 21.
property. Each of the observations is of an individual
property transaction and was obtained from the Boston
Metropolitan Mortgage Bureau. From records of each prop-
erty transaction, the following information was obtained:
the sale price, the most recent assessment, the number of
families or apartments in the structure, the number of
stories in the structure, the size of the lot in square
feet, the date of the transaction, and the street address
of the property. Non-market property transfers and trans-
actions involving properties with newly constructed build-
ings were also identified. The property assessment infor-
mation is the total assessment of both the structure and
the land.
Although the Boston Metropolitan Mortgage Bureau
is the source from which the data were obtained, it is not
actually the primary source of information. The Mortgage
Bureau combines records obtained from the Registry of Deeds
with other records in the city assessor's office. The
Registry of Deeds supplies sale price information on
each transaction. Periodically a list of the most recent
property transactions is sent to the city assessor's office.
Assessment records on each of these properties provide in-
formation not only on the most recent assessment but also on
1Sale price is not given directly on the deeds; it
must be calculated from the number of tax stamps affixed to
the deed at the time of transfer.
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the particular land use of the property and on the physi-
cal characteristics of the property.
A second source of data is the U. S. Bureau of
Census publications on population and housing character-
istics in Boston. There are several publications which
provide this information by census tract for 1940, 1950,
and 1960.1
The Metropolitan Area Planning Council also pro-
vided some data on land use in Boston.2 For each census
tract in the city, these data describe the areal distri-
bution of all land uses. For residential land uses, they
distinguish between land uses according to the number of
dwelling units on the property. There is also a dwelling
unit count -for each of three residential land use classi-
fications. These data are used chiefly to describe some
of the land use characteristics of the sampled portions
of the city. Unfortunately, on a census tract level most
of this data is not considered to be accurate enough to be
useful in the regression analysis.
B. Sampling Method
The goal of the data collection process was to
sample as much of residential Boston as possible. Two
1U. S. Bureau of Census, 'Census of Population and
Housing, census tract statistics for Boston, Mass,, 1940,
1950, 1960.
2The actual source of this data is a computer tape
which contains land use data for all of Eastern Massachu-
setts.
cross sections we.re needed: one in 1950 and one in 1960.
The principal constraint on the size of the sample was the
cost of collecting observations of residential property
transactions. A primary unit of observation in this
study is a small geographically defined area called a
census tract.2 In order to include a census tract in the
sample, there had to be a minimum number of observations
of individual property transactions within the tract.
Thus, the transaction sample was selected so as to maxi-
mize the number of census tracts containing a sufficient
number of transaction observations.
At the Metropolitan Mortgage Bureau the records of
property transactions are kept on index cards which are
filed alphabetically by street address. There are index
cards for any given address with information on every
transaction which occurred from 1940 to present on that
specific property. Furthermore, the files are divided
into nine subdivisions of Boston.
A problem was created by the fact that the density
of residential properties of different types is not the
same in all nine of the Boston subdivisions. Given limited
resources, it would have been wasteful to sample all areas
1The lack of some census data in a few census tracts
did impose an additional constraint. However, this limita-
tion was minor compared to that related to the transaction
data.
2A complete description of a "census tract" will be
given in III. D.
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with the same intensity. Some areas would have accumula-
ted a greater number of observations than were necessary,
and an insufficient number of observations would have been
obtained in other areas. Therefore, some areas had to be
sampled more intensively than others so as to assure a
fairly good chance of collecting at least six observations
of each property type in each census tract. The sampling
intensity was varied by changing the number of years which
were sampled. Preliminary testing in each subdivision was
undertaken so that an estimate could be made of the number
of years for which data collection was necessary in each
property classification. For example, in the Hyde Park
subdivision every single-family property transaction in
1950 and 1960 was recorded. In East Boston, however, the
density of single-family properties is lower and observa-
tions from several years around 1950 and 1960 were included.
In summary, the actual data recording process was
performed by inspecting all the transaction cards in each
subdivision and selecting the transactions which occurred
in the appropriate years for each property classification.
About 18,000 transactions were recorded in this way.
Since only about one in 30 transactions was acceptable,
over 500,000 transactions had to be individually examined.
1Property types are determined by the number of
families living in the dwelling. The relevant classifi-
cations are one-family, two-family, three-family, and
four-family and over.
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The only instance in which information, from more
than one card was used for one observation was in the
case of transactions involving new construction. Many
times the information on these properties was incomplete.
If another transaction could be found on property with
incomplete data within one year of the first, the informa-
tion about this transaction was used to supplement that from
the first.
C. Data Processing
Considerable clerical work was necessary to put
the raw data on property transactions into usable condition.
Since the data could not be moved at any time from
the offices of the Mortgage Bureau, they had to be
copied there by hand from the files. The coding of
structure size and property use classifications was com-
pleted in the initial recording step. After the raw
data were recorded, the street address of each of the 18,000
observations was coded according to its census tract
location.1 Also, the transactions were numbered consecu-
1The primary source for the street address coding
was: Boston House Numbers by Census Tract, published by the
Research Division of the United Community Services of Metro-
politan Boston, 1962, Boston, Mass.. For some of the
"problem" addresses, a second street address coding source
was used: Street' Cod'ing 'Index , prepared for the Eastern
Massachusetts Regional Planning Project by Wilbur Smith and
Associates, 1963-1964. In was also necessary to resort to
census tract maps in some cases. The most detailed maps for
this purpose accompany the U.S. Census of Housing: 1960,
City Blocks, Boston, Mass., U. S. Bureau of the~Census.
tively in the order of collection for identification
purposes. Finally, all the information, except the street
addresses, was transferred to IBM data cards.
Because of the large quantity of data, accuracy
tests were somewhat limited. It was only possible to
search the data for observations which were grossly out
of line. The data were first sorted by census tract and
by land use class. Then, within each tract the assessment-
to-market value ratio was calculated for each observation,
and the mean ratio of each land use class was also calcu-
lated. By comparing the assessment ratio of each observa-
tion with the mean ratio of properties of the same type
within the same census tract, suspicious observations were
located. These observations, about 500, were then double
checked with the original records. Approximately 10% of
the suspicious observations had to be dropped or corrected
either because of a clerical error or because the original
information was somehow incorrect.
The only question of accuracy with regard to prop-
erty transaction records themselves involves the calcula-
tion of sale price from tax stamps on the deed. Since the
stamps constitute a proportional tax on the sale price of
the property, there is an obvious incentive to understate
the sale price. However, according to the people at the
Mortgage Bureau, understatement of sale price occurs rather
infrequently. When it does occur, it is usually easy to
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spot. The Mortgage Bureau attempts to identify all "ques-
tionable" sales of this type on its records. None of these
questionable sales were included in the sample.
D. Description of Samples Used
The two basically different observational units
used in this study are individual property transactions
and census tracts. Individual properties usually consist
of land and one primary structure.1  Census tracts are
small areas within the city. The Bureau of Census estab-
lishes the boundaries of census tracts for statistical
purposes. The boundaries are designed to achieve some
uniformity of population characteristics, economic status,
and living conditions. The average census tract in
Boston contains roughly 4,000 to 5,000 people. In the
city of Boston there are 155 census tracts which could
conceivably be used in this study.
Given the two observational units, there are, of
course, two different possible sources of data samples:
lTransactions involving more than one structure
were recorded when the property use was "apartments." For
other property use classifications, transactions involving
more than one structure were not recorded unless it was
possible to determine the sale price and assessment of each
parcel in the group.
A more detailed description of a "census tract"
can be found in the introduction of any census publication
which presents data by census tract.
3Several tracts could not be included because they
contain the highly transient population connected with the
harbor facilities. Another tract consisting of several
islands in Boston Harbor also had to be excluded.
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individual properties and census tracts. These sources
are related by the fact that individual property data can
be aggregated by census tract and used as census tract
observations. Census tract assessment levels, market
prices, and structure and lot sizes are all variables
which are census tract averages of individual property
observations. On the other hand, all of the data which
is obtained from U. S. Bureau of Census sources is only
available by census tract. Moreover, the U. S. Census
data differs from the aggregated transaction data in that
the former is based on a 100% sample of the population and
the latter on a partial sample determined by the purchases
and sales of residential properties.
The answer to the question of which of these two
samples is appropriate for a study of assessment behavior
depends primarily on the type of assessment behavior which
is to be studied. If the objective is to examine regional
assessment behavior, i.e., to examine the variation in
assessment-to-market value ratios among different regions
within the city, then a census tract sample should be used.
In this case the study compares the experience of typical
properties in different census tracts. On the other hand,
if one is concerned with differences in assessment prac-
tices with respect to individual properties, then the
individual property sample is more appropriate. In this
study the primary concern is with regional variations in
effective tax rates, andtherefore, the census tract sample
is the principal source of information. However, because
of the fact that assessment practices which are related
to individual property characteristics may create regional
differences in assessment practices, the individual prop-
erty sample is also examined in an attempt to discover
the extent to which the observed regional data may in
fact have been generated by individual property assessment
phenomen a.
With respect to the assessment behavior models
which are developed in the next section, the observational
units for the neighborhood model are census tracts and for
the individual property model are individual properties.
Also, in the ensuing discussion, a "neighborhood" is
usually meant to be the equivalent of a census tract.
A variety of different census tract samples are
used in this study. After the transaction data is coded,
checked for accuracy, and sorted by property type, census
tracts containing fewer than six transaction observations
of a particular property type were dropped from the census
tract sample of that particular property type. Obviously,
with the variation in the density of different residential
land uses from one part of Boston to another, the samples
necessarily differ. Thus, there is a different census
tract sample for each of four property types. Although
eight property types are actually identified, one through
eight housing unit structures, all transactions on four
housing unit structures and over are aggregated into one
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property type. This was necessary because of the relative
scarcity of transaction observations on four housing unit
structures and over.
In addition to the four different property type
samples, the single-family sample is separated into white
and non-white census tracts. Thus, there are six different
census tract samples which are used in the estimation of
the neighborhood model in V.C.3. and V.C.4.. The individual
property model estimation, V.D., is based on single-family
transaction observations from the same geographic area
defined by the single-family census tract sample. Much of
the data which is examined in V.A. is generated from the
entire transaction sample.
Table 1 provides a few summary statistics on each
sample. Data on the city as a whole is also presented for
comparison. Each column, except the last one, describes
a sample which is used in this study. For example, the
first column describes the sample which is used to examine
effective tax rate variation on single-family properties.
The first entry in column one indicates that within the
geographic area of this sample, 16% of the structures are
used for single-family occupancy. The last entry at the
bottom of column one indicates that the total single-
family sample encompasses 72% of the total land area of the
city, which is 32,749 acres (last entry at bottom of last
column).
On the page following Table 1 is a map of the city
Table 1. Description of Data Samplesi
Single-Family 2
Total White Non-White
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lAll numbers are percentages except the city totals for 1960. The source
of data for A, B, and "Total Land" of Part C is the land use data supplied by the
Metropolitan Area Planning Commission of Boston. The other figures shown in C are
franthe U. S. Bureau of Census.
2The six samples described here are labeled according to the particular
type of effective tax rate examined with the sample, e.g., single-family, white




Boston Single - Family Sample
of Census Tracts
(Shaded Areas)
of Boston. The shaded areas indicate the total area
covered by the single-family property sample.
E. Sampling Bias
The source of sampling bias in the transaction
data arises from the very nature of the data itself. The
only properties which appear in the files of the Metro-
politan Mortgage Bureau are those which have been sold.
To the extent that these properties do not constitute
a truly random sample of properties, the transaction
sample is biased.
Unfortunately, it is much easier to argue that some
kind of bias probably exists than it is to estimate the
importance of the bias. Although the characteristics of
individuals who buy and sell properties and of the proper-
ties which are bought and sold are probably different from
those of the average property owner and piece of property,
an examination of the housing market itself would be
necessary to determine exactly what these differences are.
There is, however, one bit of evidence which suggests that
the transaction sample is probably not too far off the
mark with respect to market value. The coefficient of
correlation between census tract single-family market value
based on the transaction sample and the value of owner
occupied dwellings, supplied by the Bureau of Census, is
.964. The census variable is based on estimates of market
value made by owner occupants. Obviously this fact does
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not constitute conclusive evidence of the absence. of
extreme bias in the sample. The possibility of bias in





The two assessment behavior models which are devel-
oped in the following pages represent different aspects of
assessment activity: the determination of average assess-
ment levels by neighborhood and the determination of
assessment levels for individual properties within each
neighborhood. Variations in neighborhood assessment-to-
market value ratios are explained by variations in relevant
neighborhood characteristics; ratios on individual proper-
ties are explained by the extent to which they differ from
the average property with respect to observable character-
istics. Thus, the neighborhood relationship can be written
as follows:
(IV.l) (A t /Pt)i = f(N 1 ,Ni2, ... ) (i = 1, 2,..., S),
where (A t /Pt) is the average assessment-to-market value
ratio at time t in the ith neighborhood, and N 1 Ni2, etc.,
are neighborhood characteristics. For individual proper-
ties an equation analogous to equation (IV.1) can be written:
(IV.2) (at/Pt) (n ) 2,. .. ] (At/Pt)
In this case the dependent variable is the assessment-to-
market value ratio on the jth individual property in the
1 thh
ihneighborhood. The term, (At/Pt)g, is the actual aver-
age ratio in the ith neighborhood. The (nI) variables
represent characteristics of the ith individual property
in the jth neighborhood. The star superscript denotes
the fact that the measurement of the variable is in terms
of its relationship to the mean value of the variable in
the particular neighborhood in which the property is
located. For example,
(n ) =h[(N ) (ni )],
where (N ) is the mean value of characteristic number one
in the ith neighborhood, and (n 1 )1 is the value of that
characteristic for the jth individual property in the ith
neighborhood. Notice that with respect to individual
property assessments, equation (IV.2) does not imply that
neighborhood characteristics are necessarily considered
by the assessor. Neighborhood characteristics may or may
not influence (At/Pt)i.
In order to make these two models consistent, there
are some restrictions which can be placed on the exact
specification of the g function. It should be formulated
so that when all the individual property characteristics
are the same as the characteristics of the average property,
(at /pt)ij = (At/Pt)i. Both the g and h function will be
discussed more explicitly in Section C of this chapter.
The fact that the assessment process is separated,
as shown above, does not mean that the two activities are
independent. It is certainly possible that there are
assessment biases based solely on individual property
characteristics which may explain variations in neighbor-
hood ratios because of the clustering of individual prop-
erties with similar characteristics. Thus, when interpre-
ting the results of neighborhood model tests, care must
be taken not to confuse what appears to be evidence of some
type of neighborhood behavior with what is in fact a
reflection of assessment behavior with respect to individ-
ual property variations.
The possible simultaneity of equations (IV.1)
and (IV.2) could, of course, be taken into account, and the
entire system estimated simultaneously. However, from a
practical point of view, in this situation the advantage
of ordinary least squares estimation over simultaneous
equation estimation is very important. Estimation of
equation (IV.1), the more interesting of the two, can be
performed with observations totaling less than 100 while
estimation of equation (IV.2) requires the considerably
more cumbersome use of about 2,000 observations. The
difference in convenience between the two estimation proc-
esses is not small.
B. Derivation of the Neighborhood Model
A systematic derivation of the neighborhood model
is undertaken in order to provide more explicit specifica-
tion of equation (IV.1). A linear form is chosen to rep-
resent the relationship between assessment ratios and
the independent variables. Although this form creates an
estimation problem, it is still preferred over an alterna-
tive multiplicative relationship. The reason for this
choice will be discussed in V.C.2.
The assessment behavior hypotheses, described in
II.A. and II.B., suggest that there are certain objectives
of assessment policy which determine a desired pattern of
effective tax rates. Thus, the derivation of a neighbor-
hood model begins by supposing that in each assessment
period the assessor determines a particular desired level
of assessment for each ith neighborhood which is propor-
tional to the average property value in that neighborhood.
This can be represented as follows:
(IV.3) (AtPt)d = a,
where in the ith neighborhood at time t, (At/Pt)d is the
average desired ratio of assessment, At, to average market
value, Pt., and a is the average desired proportionality
factor of assessment to market value. Next, suppose that
there exists a functional relationship between a and rele-
vant neighborhood characteristics. This relationship can
be written as follows:
(IV.4) a = f (Nt)
where Nt represents several relevant neighborhood charac-
teristics. If equation (Iv.4) is in fact linear, it can
be written as,
(IV.5) a = a0 + a1N1 + a2 N2 + -e
By substituting (IV.5) into (IV.3) we arrive at the
following equation:
dI
(IV.6) (Att/Ptd =0 +aN +a2N2 +
Given that in some sense the assessor has a target
assessment ratio, the hypothesis discussed in II.C. argues
that there may be a lag in the adjustment of the actual
ratios to the desired ratios. In order to incorporate this
hypothesis into the neighborhood model, equation (IV.6) is
substituted into equation (11.3). As a result, the speci-
fication of the relationship represented by equation (IV.1)
is as follows:
(IV.7) (At/Pt) = 0(AP/P) + 1F(A/P) + 0 aN
+ a2 N2 + **
The variables (AP/P) and F are from equation (11.3) and
represent price change and transaction frequency respec-
tively. In equation (IV.7) actual neighborhood assessment
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ratios are seen to be .a linear function of seVeral neigh-
borhood characteristics and a price change variable. As
noted earlier, it is unfortunate that variables which
directly quantify assessment policy considerations are
not available. They could be used instead of the N's
of equation (IV.7). Strictly speaking, the price change
variable also represents a neighborhood characteristic
and is perhaps closely related to other characteristics.
However, its special dynamic relationship with the depen-
dent variable is more explicitly described by the model.
Obviously, if time series data were available, the dynamics
of the assessment process could be formulated in a more
powerful model. Unfortunately, we are limited to this
admittedly crude attempt to capture at least some of the
dynamic flavor of the assessment process.
C. Derivation of the Individual Property Model
Compared to the neighborhood model, the derivation
of the individual property model, equation (IV.2), is
rather straightforward. Remember that the purpose of this
model is to explain the devi-ation of individual property
assessment-to sale value ratios from the mean ratio in each
neighborhood. The independent. variables are deviations in
individual property characteristics from the mean value of
the characteristic in each neighborhood.
lSee footnote 3 , page 33 for exact definition of
(AP/P).
The specification of equation (.IJV.2). which is
chosen describes the deviations from the mean as the ratio
of the individual property characteristics to the mean
value of the characteristics. The dependent variable is
also defined in this way. Thus, the relationship can be
written as
(at/pt). . nn.
(IV.8) -A /P ) 0 + y (N + Y2 N ) + -- O
t t ii l i 2
All of the lower case letters in the above refer to
individual property variables; all of the capitalized
letters refer to neighborhood variables.
Notice that in equation (IV.8) the ratio variables
have unique values for each property in the sample even
though these values are jointly determined by a unique
1A second specification of equation (IV.2) is also
possible. In this case the deviations from the mean are
described as differences between the value of individual
property characteristics and the mean value of the char-
acteristics. Thus, equation (IV.2) can be written as
follows:
[(at ptij - (At/) = + y1 (n -N )l + y2 (n .-N )2
where the notation is the same as for equation (IV.8).
Since there is no theoretical basis for preferring
either of these two specifications of equation (IV.2),
both were estimated. However, only the results of the
estimation of equation (IV.8) are reported. This choice
is made because equation (IV.8) performed somewhat better
than the alternative formulation in terms of the proportion
of variance explained and the significance levels of the
regression coefficients. Moreover, the results of the two
estimationsare highly consistent in terms of signs and
relative magnitudes of coefficients.
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individual property value and a neighborhood average.
The latter is, of course, the same for each property
within the same neighborhood.
CHAPTER V
Empirical Tests of Hypotheses
In this chapter a variety of empirical tests are
performed on the assessment behavior hypotheses which were
developed earlier in Chapter II. Most of the results are
obtained from ordinary least squares regression analysis
of assessment behavior models. However, some interesting
evidence can be found from direct examination of effective
rate patterns.
A. Effective Tax Rate Variation Among Property Types
As indicated in Chapter III, it is possible to
classify each property transaction and therefore each
assessment-to-market value ratio according to the number
of dwelling units for which the structure is designed.
Table 2, page 63, represents citywide averages of assess-
ment ratios for each property type for 1950 and for 1960.
In parentheses below each mean is the standard deviation
of the distribution and immediately below it the number of
observations for each year-type group.
The evidence of Table 2 is quite clear; different
property types are treated differently. Mean assessment-
to-market value ratios increase steadily with increases in
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Table 2: 1950 and 1960 Assessment-to-Market
Value Ratios, Standard Deviations, and





























































the number of families per structure. In 1960 the lowest
mean ratio is that for single-family properties, .3840.
The highest ratio is for seven-family properties, .7008.
The only significant exception to this pattern in 1960 is
the mean ratio on structures with eight-families or more.
This particular ratio is less than the mean ratios of
property types four through seven. One explanation for
this deviation from the pattern is that the eight-family
or more property type includes many large apartment build-
ings. Perhaps special tax treatment was afforded these
structures beginning some time after 1950. The only other
exception to the general pattern of increasing ratios is in
the 1950, five-family group. However, this deviation is
well within the margin of statistical error.
Table 2 also shows that assessment ratios declined
in every property class between 1950 and 1960. Moreover,
the decline is about the same magnitude for each property
type.
Although there are several possible explanations
for the assessment ratio pattern shown by Table 2, an
assessment behavior hypothesis based on the application of
a benefit principle appears to be the one most consistent
with the results. Given that the population density per
dollar of property value rises with the number of families
per structure, rising assessment ratios tend to equalize
per family tax burdens among various property types. Even
though there may be taxpayer pressure for intra-neighbor-
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hood uniformity, assessment ratio differentiation based on
property types is probably an acceptable form of assess-
ment discrimination.
The fact that single-family properties are the
most favorably treated is consistent with an argument made
earlier that single-family property owners are perhaps the
most politically effective group of residential property
owners. However, this hypothesis does not explain why
there is a progressive gradation among the other property
types. The existence of a satisfactory political explana-
tion for the entire inter-property type pattern would appear
to be unlikely.
Another explanation for the results of Table 2 is
that inter-neighborhood assessment ratio variation is the
underlying reason for the inter-property type variation.
The fact that different property types are concentrated in
different neighborhoods makes this explanation a distinct
possibility. For example, single-family properties may not
be receiving preferential treatment because of their prop-
erty type but because most of these properties are located
in areas of the city which have low assessment ratios for
all property types. However, close examination of assess-
ment ratios by neighborhood does not support this explana-
tion. In 1960 there are 53 neighborhood observations with
at least six assessment ratio observations for each of the
first three property types. In 40.of these neighborhoods,
the order of assessment ratio magnitudes by property type
is exactly the same as that displayed by Tabl.e 2. More-
over, only two of the order inversions are caused by a
difference in assessment ratios of more than 5%. Evident-
ly, the general pattern of Table 2 is indicative of what
one could expect to observe in almost any area of Boston.
It is also possible that the rate of price increase
falls with increases in the number of families per struc-
ture. Given a lag in the assessment mechanism a differen-
tialrate of price increase of this type would yield the
observed pattern of assessment-to-market value ratios if
the differences in the rates were large enough. Although
the actual price increases of the different property types
show a general tendency to decline with increases in the
number of families per structure, the price increases are
all within three percentage points of one another. Such
small differences could account for only insignificant
differences in assessment-to-market value ratios.
One final explanation for the positive relationship
between families per structure and assessment ratios is
that structure size also tends to increase with families
per structure. If assessors weight the size of a structure
too heavily in their estimation of total property value, then
perhaps it is this error which is the real cause of the
observed pattern of assessment ratios. However, it is hard
to believe that assessment errors of this type would cause
very large variations in assessment ratios. The highest
ratios are almost twice the size of the smallest.
B. New. Construction
There are several reasons to expect assessment
ratios on properties with newly constructed buildings to
be higher than on older properties. The assessment lag
hypothesis argues that assessments tend to lag by neigh-
borhoods. The updating of assessments is not performed
randomly on individual properties throughout the city.
Instead, one area at a time is reassessed. However, when
a new structure is built on a vacant lot, reassessment of
that individual property is unavoidable. Given a trend of
generally rising prices, assessments are usually lower than
what the assessor would like them to be. Therefore, there
probably is a tendency to assess newly constructed proper-
ties at somewhat higher ratios than others in the same
neighborhood. Moreover, since newly constructed properties
either have been very recently sold or are about to be
sold, market value is well-known. Thus, the assessor has
no reason to underassess because he is uncertain of the
exact size of the assessment-to-market value ratio which
he is establishing.
Unfortunately, data on new construction are not
very satisfactory. To begin with, there is only a limited
amount of new residential construction in Boston, which is
a city where over 90% of all residential properties were
built before 1939.. Thus, the sample of newly constructed
properties is small. Another problem is created because
the property transaction records do not reliably identify
transactions involving new construction. The data on some
new construction transactions were incomplete, thus exclud-
ing these observations from the sample. Also, not all new
construction transactions were identified as such, and, as
a result, they were recorded as normal transactions.
Nevertheless, based on the data which does exist, it
appears that new construction tends to be assessed at a
higher proportion of market value than other properties
of the same type.
In neighborhoods where new construction is observed,
the mean assessment ratios for the new construction are
compared to the means of properties of similar types.
Comparisons are made by neighborhood so that other factors
can be held reasonably constant in each case. There are 35
of these intra-neighborhood comparisons between new con-
struction and older properties of similar types. In 20
cases the assessment-to-market value ratios on the new
construction are higher, and in 13 cases they are lower.
The ratios are equal in two cases. The average difference
between the ratios is about 5%.
Additional evidence consistent with the above was
obtained from a citywide sample of transactions which were
identified only as "houses." Supposedly, this property
description is frequently given to newly constructed single-
family dwellings. There were 235 of these transactions in
1960 with an average assessment ratio of .L4406. This is
significantly higher than the .3840 ratio on older single-
family properties in 1960.
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Another test of the hypothesis that the assessor
discriminates against new. construction would be to include
a variable representing the' neighborhood density of new
construction in the assessment behavior model which is
tested in the next section. However, because of the very
small number of census tracts with any new single-family
construction in 1960, this would not be very informative.
C. Neighborhood Model
The assessment behavior hypotheses of Chapter II
suggest numerous reasons for variations in effective tax
rates by neighborhood. In order to test these hypotheses,
an assessment behavior model is developed in IV.B. The
final formulation of this neighborhood assessment behavior
model is reproduced below:
(IV.7) (At/Pt ~ 0 (AP/P) + 6 F(AP/P) + a0 + a N
+ a 2N2  + --- ,
Testing of equation (IV.7) will be performed by use of
ordinary least squares regression analysis.
The empirical tests are based primarily on a 1960
sample of single-family properties. Although some tests
are performed on other 1960 samples, namely, two-family,
three.-family, and multiple-family properties, the single-
family sample is preferred' for several reasons. First,
single-family properties possess relatively more homogeneous
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characteristics. Thus,: .this. class of property lends it-
self more readily than do other classes of property to the
establishment of uniform assessment standards. Second,
the relatively large number of observable sales of single-
family properties allows the broadest possible cross-
section of the city to be studied. The use of any other
property classifications considerably restricts the sample.
The results based on samples other than that of single-
family properties are examined as a group at the end of
Chapter V. after a detailed discussion of the single-family
results. A description of each of these samples can be
found in III.D..
1. Variables of the Model
The following discussion specifically defines each
variable which is tested in equation (IV.7). In addition,
the relevance of each independent variable with respect to
the various assessment behavior hypotheses is discussed.
Since the model attempts to explain variations in 1960
assessment-to-market value ratios, all of the variables,
except the price change variable, are based on a 1960
cross-section. Price change is derived from a 1950 and
1960.cross-section.
a. Dependent Variables
As described in III.D., neighborhood assess-
ment and market value, At and Pt respectively, are averages
of assessments and sale prices by neighborhood. Unless
otherwise indicated, the assessment-to-market value ratios
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are those of single-family properties. The "t" subscript
is, of course, equal to 1960.
b. Independent Variables
Price Change and Transaction Frequency
Price change and transaction frequency are
both already explicitly included in equation (IV.7). The
price change variable tests the effect of assessment lags
on assessment-to-market value ratios, and the transaction
frequency variable, which enters multiplicatively with
price change, tests the effect of transaction frequency
on the length of the assessment lag.
Price change is defined as (Pt-Pt-1)/(Pt +
Pt-1)/2), where Pt is the 1960 average price and Pt-1 is
the 1950 average price. The average prices are obtained
from the sample of individual property transactions.
Transaction frequency is defined as the per-
centage of single-family properties which are sold per
year. Because the number of sales can only be measured
for the period of time in which transactions were recorded,
1960 is the only year within the 1959-1961 data collection
period in which single-family transactions were recorded
in every section of the city. Information on transactions
for the entire period 1958-1960 would be much more desirable.
Data on the total number of single-family properties in
each neighborhood are taken from the U.S. Census of Housing.
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Hous ing Conditions
There are three available measures of general
neighborhood housing conditions, and each one may reflect
slightly different aspects of assessment behavior.
First, there is an index of the physical
condition of residential structures. It is defined as the
percentage of dwelling units classified as dilapidated or
deteriorated by the U.S. Census of Housing. In connection
with this variable, the assumption is made that the general
physical condition of structures within a neighborhood
is associated with important housing market externalities.
To the extent that assessors do not consider the effect of
negative housing market externalities, they will over-
estimate market value, and assessment-to-market value
ratios will tend to increase with the degree of deteriora-
tion. However, there are at least two other hypotheses
which are also consistent with a positive relation between
deteriorated and dilapidated housing and assessment-to-
market value ratios: an assessment policy based on a
benefit principle of taxation and an assessment policy
which, because of the several possible social goals dis-
cussed in II.A., tends to favor "nice" neighborhoods.
Deteriorated neighborhoods not only require higher per
capita public service expenditures but also are not likely
to be considered "nice" neighborhoods.
A second measure of housing quality is the
degree of overcrowding in terms of persons per room. Like
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physical deterioration, overcrowding is also associated
with negative housing market externalities. Moreover, it
is positively correlated with physical deterioration.
Thus, all the reasons given above for expecting a positive
relationship between percentage of deteriorated housing
and assessment-to-market value ratios also suggest a
positive relationship between the degree of overcrowding
and assessment-to-market value ratios. The only reason
for the assessment process to differentiate between dete-
icration and overcrowding is the possibility that crowded
neighborhoods exert relatively more political pressure on
assessment decisions. However, this possibility is un-
likely because any potentially greater political power of
overcrowded areas is probably nullified by their relative
lack of political sophistication.
The measure of overcrowding which is used is
the percentage of housing units with 1.01 or more persons
per room. The data source is the U.S. Census of Housing.
The age of structures is a third housing
condition variable which may be related to assessment
behavior. Presumably, some concept of depreciati-on is in-
volved in the estimation of market value. If depreciation
schedules are incorrect and are consistently applied, there
will be systematic variation in assessment ratios according
to age. The particular pattern of variation will be a
function of the type of error connected with the estimated
depreciation schedule. It is also possible that the value
of older properties is simply more difficult to estimate
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accurately and that, realizing this, the assessor tends to
undervalue older properties relative to newer properties.
Relative undervaluation errors are less likely to create
taxpayer discontent than relative overvaluation errors.
The positive relationship between age and physical
deterioration suggests that the age variable may reflect
some of the physical deterioration effect. However, the
importance of this possibility cannot be too great because
age is not a very reliable indicator of negative external-
ities in the housing market. For instance, in Boston the
structures in neighborhoods with low quality housing are
generally older than those in the outlying sections of
the city, like Hyde Park, where housing quality is much
higher. On the other hand, some of the very oldest sections
of Boston, like Beacon Hill, consist of predominantly high
quality structures.
The only available measure of structure age
is based on all of the structures in a given neighborhood.
The structure age variable is obtained from the U.S.
Census of Housing and is defined as the percentage of
structures built before 1939. It would, of course, be
much more desirable to know the age of the structures
which were sampled by transactions.
Racial 'and Ethnic Compos.ition
Three variables representing racial and ethnic
composition by neighborhood are tested in equation (IV.7).
They are measured as population percentages of Irish,
Italians, and Negroes. The data are obtained from the
U.S. Census of Population. The racial and ethnic variables
test the importance of political factors in the assessment
process. It is expected that political considerations tend
to favor the politically influential Italian and Irish
neighborhoods and to discriminate against Negro areas.
However, differentially high effective tax rates in Negro
neighborhoods may also reflect the influence of other
factors in the assessment process. First of all, there may
be a desire to maintain a certain racial mixture within the
city by using lower effective tax rates to counteract the
outward migration of white citizens. Secondly, Negro
population density is associated with negative housing
market externalities which can also be imperfectly cap-
tured by other variables in the model. Thus, the partic-
ular causal relationship between Negro density and effec-
tive tax rates may be difficult to determine.
Income and Market Value
Median family income data is obtained from the
U.S. Census of Housing. Market value data specifically
defined as the "average value of owner occupied dwellings"
are also taken from the U.S. Census of Housing. 1 Another
measure of single-family market value is based on the sample
lValue data are restricted to owner occupied units
having only one housing unit in the structure and no busi-
ness associated with the property, i.e., single-family
properties.
of property transactions. The two market value measures
are very highly correlated. 'However, since the purpose of
this independent variable is to capture neighborhood
characteristics as opposed to the specific characteristics
of the sampled properties, the census measure is preferred.
Moreover, in IV.C.2, it will be argued that, because of a
possible estimation problem, there is an additional reason
for preferring the census measure of market value over the
transaction sample estimate.1
Market value and family income are, of course, very
closely related. In fact, they are perhaps too closely re-
lated for regression analysis to reveal any differences
between them which may exist in their relationships with
assessment ratios. However, this collinearity problem is
more appropriately discussed when the estimation of the
model is presented.
The assessment behavior hypotheses suggest several
reasons to expect a negative relationship between assess-
ment ratios and the market value and income variables. An
application of the benefit principle and/or an effort to
differentially favor "nice" neighborhoods would be consis-
tent with a negative relationship. Moreover, although it
is possible that market value and income capture somewhat
different dimensions of a wide variety of neighborhood
1Since regression results are about the same using
both market 'value measures, this is not a crucial decision.
characteristi.cs, both variables are probably ,related to
externalities in much the' same way. To the extent that
the assessment process fails to take externalities into
consideration, there will be *a tendency to underestimate
market value in areas with positive externalities and to
overestimate value in areas with negative externalities.
The only real difference between these variables
exists because market value is directly observable by the
assessor whereas family income is not. Nevertheless, the
assessor certainly has some general notion of what are high
and low income neighborhoods.
Lot Size and Structure' Size
The hypothesis of Chapter II part B holds that the
market value of residential property is a function of two
important factors: the characteristics of the specific
property and the general character of the neighborhood in
which the property is located. It is the assessor's esti-
mation of the first factor's contribution to market value
which is directly related to the two variables, lot size
and structure size. The lot size variable is defined as the
land area of a lot, and the structure size variable measures
only one dimension of structure size, the' height of a struc-
ture in terms of stories.
Although the hypothesis of II.B. stresses the possi-
ble importance of assessment errors 'caused by failure to
consider the influence of neighborhood factors on market
value, it is also possible that there are systematic errors
in the estimation of the specific property component of
total value. Obj'ective. appraisals of individual properties
must rely on certain "rules -of thumb" which take into ac-
count many readily observable physical characteristics.
Lot size and structure size are two obvious factors which
are considered. However, to the extent that the "rules
of thumb" are incorrect, assessment ratios will tend to be
biased. For instance, if lot size is weighted too heavily,
then properties with larger lots will be assessed at higher
ratios than properties with smaller lots.
This suggested relationship between structure and
lot sizes and assessment ratios is based essentially on
individual property assessment decisions. If such a rela-
tionship does in fact exist, the reason that it may account
for some of the variation in neighborhood assessment-to-
market value ratios is that there are concentrations within
the city of properties with similar physical characteristics.
A further test of this hypothesis is provided by the esti-
mation of the individual property model.
In addition to their possible relationship to
individual property assessment decisions, these two vari-
ables are probably associated with several aspects of
general neighborhood character. For example, taller single-
family buildings tend to be older and more deteriorated.
Larger lots are characteristic of the newer, higher income
neighborhoods. Thus, both variables may also explain some
assessment-to-market value ratio variation which is associa-
ted with variations in neighborhood characteristics.
Perhaps an even more 'important neighborhood
characteristic which may be reflected by the average
structure size of single-family dwellings is :suggested by
the results shown in V.A. There.' it is clearly demonstra-
ted that multiple family structures have generally higher
assessment ratios than single-family structures. In view
of this situation, it is possible that assessment ratios
on single-family dwellings tend to be higher in neighbor-
hoods which have a relatively higher concentration of
multiple family dwellings than in neighborhoods with rela-
tively low concentrations of multiple family dwellings.
Since taller single-family buildings are more likely to be
located in neighborhoods with relatively high multiple
family density, single-family structure size would tend to
be positively related to assessment ratios. The influence
of multiple family density on single-family assessment
ratios in predominantly multiple family neighborhoods may
be due to the existence of less single-family taxpayer
resistance to higher assessments. In such neighborhoods
the single-family owner is surrounded by many properties
which have higher assessments than his own, and therefore,
he is likely to be less inclined to complain about his
own high ratio.
The fact that structure size and lot size may
pick up certain neighborhood characteristics which are not
well accounted for by other variables' may somewhat compli-
cate the interpretation of the' results. This possibility
will be further analyzed in the discussion of regression
results.
Single'-Family St:ruc't ure Dehslty
Data on single-family structure density are
obtained from the' U.S.' Cens'us 'of Housing, The exact
definition of this variable is the fraction of total
housing units contained in single-family structures.
With respect to assessment behavior hypotheses,
single-family density may indicate several relevant neigh-
borhood characteristics. First, single-family occupants
are usually owner occupants, and owner occupants, as a
group, are likely to exert greater political pressure on
assessment decisions. Secondly, a predominantly single-
family neighborhood is likely to be a well-maintained
neighborhood. Single-family occupancy is a characteristic
of high quality housing while in areas of low quality
housing, single-family structures are relatively scarce.
Thirdly, the density of multiple family structures is, of
course, inversely related to single-family density. Thus,
this variable may represent the effect of multiple family
densities on single-family assessment-to-market value
ratios. The multiple family effect is described in the
previous discussion of the structure and lot size variables.
All three of these neighborhood characteristics which are
associated with single-family density suggest a negative
relationship between single-family density and assessment-
to-market value ratios.
Areal Share of Residential Land
A possible source of political pressure which
would tend to benefit single-family properties may be ex-
erted by all residential property owners. That is to say,
the assessment process may favor all types of residential
property in predominantly residential areas. A variable
which measures residential density is the areal share of
residential land or, more specifically, the fraction of
total land area in each census tract which is devoted to
permanent residential uses. The data for this variable
are obtained from the land use survey conducted by the.
Metropolitan Area Planning Council.
2. A Problem in Estimation
Equation (IV.7) which was developed in IV.B. is a
linear specification of equation (IV.1). Now that the
various independent variables have been defined, it is
appropriate to discuss the estimation problem associated
with equation (IV.7). In the process of developing equa-
tion (IV.7),several implicit assumptions pertaining to the
error term were made. These assumptions must now be made
clear. Essentially, we hypothesized a model of the follow-
ing general type:
(V.1) A = [f(N 1,N2, ... P + n ,
where T, is the error term. This equation divided by P
yields equation (IV.7), orin terms of the above,
(V.2). A/P = f(N, 2  ... ) + n/P,
Thus, we have two different error terms in (V.1) and (V.2).
Which is the true error term, n or n/P? The assumption
which has been made in this respect is that the latter is
the more desirable formulation because n/P is more likely
to be randomly distributed with constant variance than is
n. In equation (V.1) the variance of the error, n, is
probably a positive function of P, i.e., higher priced
properties are more likely to have large absolute assess-
ment errors than lower priced properties. Moreover, in
equation (V.2) where A/P is the dependent variable, the
variance of the error is likely to be more uniform. In
short, division by P reduces the heteroscedasticity of
equation (V.1).
Unfortunately, the above solution poses another
problem. As suggested in the last section, one of the N's
in equation (V.2) is expected to be P, the mean sale price
of recorded transactions. This implies that the denomina-
tor of the dependent variable in equation .(V.2). is itself
an independent variable, i.e., equation (V.2) becomes
(V.3) A/P = f(P, N1 , N2, ... ) + n/P.
This situation allows possible spurious correlation between
A/P and P to bias the estimated coefficient of P downward.
One way to avoid this problem is to estimate a
multiplicative specification of equation (IV.7). If this
is donethe heteroscedasticity problem does not exist.1
Furthermore, the spurious correlation problem is removed.
Unfortunately, however, a multiplicative model imposes an
unrealistic requirement on the relationship between assess-
ment-sales ratios and several independent variables.
Specifically, the problem is that a multiplicative, or
double-log, equation relates percentage changes between the
dependent variable and the independent variables. Although
this relationship may serve as a fairly good approximation
over the observed range for several of the dependent vari-
ables such as income, market value, price change, structure
size, and lot size, it is a less than adequate representa-
tion of the others.
The problem can be illustrated by an examination
of the observed range of the variable defined as percent
non-white housing unit occupancy. A multiplicative equa-
tion implies that a difference in Negro densities of 0.2%
and 0.4% will have the same percentage effect on assess-
ment-sales ratios as a difference of 40% and 80% because
in each case one value is larger than the other by an
equivalent percentage. Not only is this type of relation
highly unlikely, but the problem of how to deal with zero
value observations is also created. Thus, if the housing
1In fact, estimation of (V.1) and (V.2) will yield
exactly the same results; only the coefficient of multiple
correlation will be different.
condition variable or any of the ethnic or racial variables
turn out to be significant variables, a linear formulation
is preferred.
Given a preference for a linear specification, the
importance of the spurious correlation problem can still be
diminished. Instead of using the same variable to repre-
sent market value on both sides of (V.3), some other vari-
able may replace P on the righthand side of (V.3). If this
other variable is less than perfectly correlated with P,
then the spurious correlation is at least reduced. As noted
in V.C.l.b., two variables representing neighborhood market
value are available. Moreover, it is argued in V.C.l.b. that
the alternative variable is preferred for theoretical reasons.
The alternative to the mean transaction price is the average
value of owner occupied dwellings.
3. Estimation of Neighborhood Assessment-to-Market
Value Ratios: Single-Family Properties
Using the neighborhood assessment behavior model
which is described by equation (IV.7), single-family assess-
ment-to-market value ratios are estimated by ordinary least
squares. For convenient reference the model to be estimated
is restated as follows:
(IV.7) (At /Pt) ~ O(AP/P) + O1F(AP/P) + a0 +aN
+ 2 N2 +..
where At and Pt are 1960 averages of assessments and sale
prices on single-family properties; AP/P is the single-family
percentage average price change between 1950 and 1960;. F
is the per'centage of single-family properties which are
sold per year; and the N's are various neighborhood char-
acteristics which are discussed in one of the preceding
sections of this chapter, C.l.b. Regression results based
on various combinations of independent variables and on
different data samples are shown in tables which are con-
tained in Appendix A. A simple correlation matrix is
presented in Appendix B. Each regression equation is
labeled by its table number and its number within the
table, e.g., in Table 3 the equations are labeled 3.1,
3.2, etc..
Each entry in the tables consistsof the regression
coefficient, the elasticity of the dependent variable with
respect to each independent variable, and the t-statistic
associated with the regression coefficient. The elasticity,
which is in brackets below the regression coefficient, is
presented in order to facilitate the comparison of the
effects of different variables which are not measured in
the same units. Each elasticity is calculated at the point
of the means because the elasticities of a linear relation-
ship vary continuously over the variable range. The t-
statistic is in parentheses below the elasticity.
The entry of an asterisk in the table indicates that
the independent variable did not significantly improve the
explanatory power of the equation. The specific criteria
used to. decide whether or .not a variable should be included
are the t-statistics and the standard error of the regres-
sion. If the t-statistic of a variable is equal to or
greater than 1.0 and the inclusion of that variable lowers
the standard error of the regression, it is considered to
be significant. The results presented are those without
the insignificant variables. A dash indicates that there
is apriori reason why the inclusion of the variable was
deemed to be inappropriate. The particular reasons will
be made clear in the course of the discussion.
The results shown in Table 3 indicate that the in-
dependent variables in each regression explain a substan-
tial part of the variation of the dependent variable.
Depending on the particular equation, the coefficients of
multiple correlation indicate that from 74% to 81% of the
variation is explained. The fact that the F-statistics
are greater than what is required at the 0.01 confidence
level denotes that highly significant associations exist
between the independent and dependent variables in each
regression. Since the goal here is to attempt to explain
the systematic variation in assessment ratios while recog-
nizing that a significant part of the variation is random,
the most important tests of the model lie in the significance
1For 86 observations and eight variables (including
a constant), a F-statistic of 2.73 or greater is sufficient
to reject the null hypothesis that no relationship exists.
and reasonableness of the results pertaining to individual
variables.
In order to simplify the expostion, the regression
results of one variable at a time are discussed. The
variables representing price change and transaction fre-
quency, racial and ethnic composition, and housing condi-
tions are discussed first. The results of these variables
are not significantly affected by certain constraints which
are placed on the model in an effort to analyze the results
associated with some of the other variables. The next
variables discussed are income and market value. Because
of the high collinearity between these two variables, the
model is not estimated with both variables together. Re-
gression equation (3.1) is the result of estimation without
the income variables, and the regression equation (3.2) is
the result of estimation without the market value variable.
Following the discussion of the income and market value
variables is a discussion of the structure and lot size
variables and the problems of interpretation related to
them. Finally, after the results of the full model have been
presented, some further results connected with the racial
effect and the transaction frequency effect are discussed.
Price Change and Transaction Frequency
According to the assessment lag hypothesis, price
increases ought to be negatively related to assessment
ratios, i.e., #0 < 0. In addition, given the 1950 average
assessment and the average level of market prices in 1950
and 196.0, it is possible to calculate the value of 0
which would result from a complete lack of assessment
adjustment. This minimum value of a0 is -.41. The re-
gression results provide rather good substantiation of the
lag hypothesis. The estimated price change coefficient,
00, is highly significant, and it lies in the expected
range if -.41 to 0 2
Not supported by the results of Table 3 is the
supposed effect of transaction frequency on the length
of the assessment lag. Although the coefficient of the
multiplicative term, , is greater than zero, as expected,
it is not significant. (Since the multiplicative term is
not significant in any of the regressions shown in Table 3,
no entry is made for it in the table.) However, given the
poor quality of the transaction frequency data, this evi-
dence cannot be considered conclusive. Another test of
the transaction frequency effect is performed at the end
of this section.
An indication of the magnitude of the price change
influence on assessment-sales ratios can be obtained by
calculating the estimated average. value of the unobservable
1See footnote 1, page 34.
2With 79 degrees of freedom, a coefficient is
significant at the .01 level if its.. t-statistic is equal
to or greater than 2.58.
variable, (A6 6) d . which is the desired. 196.0 ratio. The
value of (A6 6 d cal-culated' from regression equation (3.1)
is .467, and it provides an estimate of what. the average
assessment ratio would have been in 1960 if prices had not
changed between 1950 and 1960.1 This .467 estimate is 18%
higher than the actual 1960 ratio of .396.
Ethnic' 'and Ra'cial Composition
Negro population density is the only one of the
three racial and ethnic variables which is significant in
equations (3.1) and (3.2). The coefficient of the Negro
density variable passes the t-test at the .01 confidence
level while the t-statistics of the Italian and Irish
density variables are considerably less than 1.0. The
positive sign on the Negro variable indicates that rela-
tively high assessment ratios are associated with areas
of relatively high Negro densities. Moreover, given the
wide variation in Negro densities, a Negro density elas-
ticity in the vicinity of .039, as shown in equation (3.1),
implies that there is a substantial jump in assessment
ratios in Negro areas ceteris paribus. A detailed exami-
nation of the racial effect is undertaken following the
variable by variable discussion of the results. At that
time a more precise estimate will be made of the positive
tax differential which is levied on Negro areas.
1Calculation of this..estimate involves multiplying
the mean. of the price change. variable by its regression
coefficient and subtracting this negative result from the
mean of the dependent variable.
These results are consistent with those of the
Oldman and Aaron assessment-to-market value ratio study
of Boston. Their study estimates a 54% ratio of assessed
value to market value on single-family properties in the
predominantly Negro Roxbury section and a 34% ratio for
single-family properties in the city as a whole. A
similar estimate made on the basis of the present study
indicates that in the eight census tracts with the highest
Negro densities, average density 64%, the assessment ratio
on single-family properties is 64%. The ratio on single-
family properties for the entire city is 40%.2
One possible explanation for this apparent tax rate
discrimination against Negro neighborhoods is based on the
fact that many Negro neighborhoods are slum neighborhoods.
It can be argued that the relatively large negative housing
market externalities and the below average inflation of
property values in slum areas both combine to cause higher
0. Oldman and H. Aaron, "Assessment-Sales Ratios
Under the Boston Property Tax," National Tax Journal,
March, 1965, p. 40.
2The reason for the rather substantial difference
between the absolute values of the Oldman and Aaron esti-
mates and the estimates of this study is partially due to
observations. This study's estimate is based on census
tract observations. Oldman and Aaron's is based on indi-
vidual property observations. Since there are relatively
fewer individual property observations in Roxbury, these
above average observations are given less weight in the
Oldman and Aaron study. Also, the eight census tracts with
highest Negro densities do not encompass the same geograph-
ical area as Roxbury because these census tracts are not
all in Roxbury and all census tracts in Roxbury are not
among the eight selected census tracts.
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assessment ratios in Negro areas. However, within the
assessment model both of these factors are taken into
account by specific variables, which in equation (3.1)
are the density of deteriorated and dilapidated housing
and the average price change of single-family properties.
With these two variables also included in the regression,
it is difficult to explain the strong performance of the
Negro density variable based solely on a "declining"
neighborhood argument.
A better explanation of the Negro effect is that
it is the result of factors related to the relative polit-
ical weakness of the Negro community. As suggested earlier,
the city is probably not concerned about losing Negroes to
the suburbs. A more likely fear is that of gaining large
numbers of Negroes from the South. Moreover, the migration
of middle-to-upper income families, almost exclusively
white, to suburbia is of great concern to the city. Add
to this situation the Negro community's lack of influence in
Boston politics, and a political explanation for what is
observed is certainly possible.
Although the signs of the Italian and Irish variables
are negative, as expected, their insignificance in equations
(3.1) and (3.2) suggests that these groups do not influence
1The simple correlation between Negro density and
density of deteriorated and dilapidated housing is .53.
The average density of deteriorated and dilapidated housing
units in Negro areas is .47 compared to .14 in the rest of
the city. The average percentage price increase on single-
family dwellings between 1950 and 1960 is 9% in Negro areas
and 40% in the rest of the city.
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assessment. decisions. 1 ' Perhaps neither of these communi-
ties is sufficiently concentrated to allow an effective
discriminatory policy on their behalf.
Housing Conditions
Only one of the three housing condition variables is
significant when all three are included as explanatory
variables. The density of deteriorated and dilapidated
housing has a positive sign and is significant at the 95%
confidence level in equation (3.1) and at the 98% confidence
level in equation (3.2). As stated in C.l.b. of this
chapter, a positive relation between poor housing condi-
tions and high assessment-to-market value ratios can be
attributed to three possible factors: the influence of
negative housing market externalities associated with
deteriorated and dilapidated housing, an application of a
benefit principle to assessment decisions, and an assess-
ment policy which favors "nice" neighborhoods.
The two housing condition variables which are
insignificant in equations (3.1) and (3.2), neighborhood
structure age and the index of crowding, are both posi-
tively correlated with the density of deteriorated and
1There are, however, certain conditions under which
one or the other of these variables do enter the model with
t-statistics slightly greater than 1.0.. These cases will be
discussed later in this chapter.
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dilapidated housing.. In order to. examine their relation-
ship to the dependent. variable, they are substituted for
the deteriorated housing variable. As equation (3.3)
shows, neither variable performs well even in the absence
of the deteriorated and dilapidated housing variable. The
structure age variable is barely significant at the 0.3
level. The index of crowdinghaving a t-statistic of less
than 1.0, is considered insignificant and therefore is not
entered in the table of results. Worth noting, however,
is the negative partial correlation between structure age
2
and assessment ratios. Considering that deterioration
is positively related to assessment ratios, a negative
sign on the age variable suggests that it is not the effect
of physical deterioration which this variable is explaining.
Perhaps the uncertainty of market value estimation which is
associated with older properties is responsible for this
negative partial correlation.
1The simple correlation between the density of
deteriorated and dilapidated housing and structure age is
.26, and that between the density of deteriorated and
dilapidated housing and the density of structures with
1.01 or more persons per room is .40.
2 Since the definition of structure age is the
density of structures built before 1939, the negative
partial correlation means that neighborhoods with older
buildings tend to have lower assessment-to-market value
ratios.
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Market Value and Median Family Income
As stated earlier, high collinearity exists between
market value and median family income. The simple corre-
lation between the two variables is .72, and, when both
variables are entered into the same regression, neither is
significant. However, regressions (3.1) and (3.2) show
that if either one of the variables is excluded from the
estimation process, the other is significant at about the
96% confidence level. Moreover, the two equations, (3.1)
and (3.2), are very similar in other respects. The coeffi-
cients of multiple correlation of the two regressions are
almost equal, and the same group of other independent vari-
ables is significant in each regression. Also, the
coefficients of the other independent variables are com-
parable. Thus, it appears that the income and market value
variables are explaining the same general s-ource of vari-
ation in assessment-to-market value ratios.
Possible explanations for the negative relationship
between these two variables and the dependent variable are
exactly the same as those which applied to the positive
relationship between deteriorated and dil&pidated housing
and the dependent variable. Housing market externalities,
the application of a benefit principle, and a policy favor-
ing "nice" neighborhoods are all possible explanations.
This negative relationship between market value and
assessment-to-market value ratios is also observed in two
other property tax studies. Based on assessment ratio data
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on non-farm housing obtained from a nationwide sample,
Frederick Bird concludes that there is a "measurable
degree" of "regression" in the assessment of these
1properties, The regressivity is observed in large and
small cities with various types of assessment organiza-
tions.
The other source of data on this relationship is
found in the Oldman and Aaron Boston study. They found
that the relationship between price and assessment-to-
market value ratios is negative within any one property
type.2  As in the case of the national data, this relation-
ship is observed without taking into account other possi-
ble sources of assessment-to-market value variation.
lF. L. Bird, The General Property Tax: Findings of
the 1957 Census of Governments, (Chicago: Public Adminis-
Eration Service, 1960), pp. 58-60. The source of data used
in Bird's study is based on Table 14 in the 1957 Census of
Governments, Vol. V, "Taxable Property Values in the United
States, 1959." Regressivity is measured by taking the
average of the assessment ratios and dividing it by the
"sales-based" average assessment ratio. This latter ratio
is defined as the ratio of the total assessed value of all
the properties in the sample to the total market value of
all the properties in the sample. Thus, the denominator
of the regressivity measure weights the assessment ratios
of higher priced properties more heavily than lower priced
properties. If the ratio of the two different assessment
ratios is greater than one,, then the higher priced properties
must tend to have lower assessment ratios.
2Oldman and Aaron, "Assessment-Sales Ratios under the
Boston Property Tax," National Tax Journal, March 1965, p.
43.
The data of the present study display the same type
of relationship. For example, the simple correlation be-
tween the market value of single-family properties and the
assessment-to-market value ratio on single-family proper-
ties is -.200. However, within the context of a multiple
regression equation, the price change variable explains
part of the variation associated with market value. With-
out the price change variable in equation (3.1), the esti-
mated coefficient of the market value variable is a much
larger negative number, -.0493, and is highly significant
at the .01 confidence level. Thus, part of the observed
inverse relationship between market value and assessment-
to-market value ratios, by themselves, can be attributed
to a true market value effect; another part must be
ascribed to the effect of assessment lags in a period of
rising market prices.
More information on inter-relationships between the
market value and income variables and the other independent
variables is presented in the following discussion of the
structure and lot size variables.
Structure Size and Lot Size
As equations (3.1) and (3.2) show, significant partial
correlation coefficients are estimated for both the structure
size and lot size variables. In both cases the coefficients
are significant at the 99% confidence level. Also, both
coefficients are positive.
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Earlier in this chapter. it was suggested that there
are at least three interpretations of these significant
regression results. First,. the assessor may simply be
over-weighting the importance of structure size and lot
size in the calculation of his market. value estimates.
Thus, properties with taller buildings and/or larger lots
are assessed at a higher proportion of market value than
average properties. Given that many neighborhoods are
fairly homogeneous with respect to structure size and lot
size, this type of assessment bias is very likely to be a
significant factor in explaining inter-neighborhood
assessment-to-market value ratio variation.
A second interpretation of the structure size result
is suggested by the possibility of a "multiple family"
effect on single-family properties. As suggested in
V.C.l.b., the presence of high densities of multiple
family properties may tend to pull up the assessment-to-
market value ratios on single-family properties. Thus,
if taller single-family structures are more likely than
not to be located in areas of high multiple family densi-
ties, single-family structure size will tend to be possi-
tively related to assessment-to-market value ratios.
1 In Section A of this chapter, data are presented
which clearly indicate that assessment-to-market value ratios
are positively related to the number of families per
structure.
The third explanation for the structure size and lot
size results is somewhat more involved than either of the
previous two. In addition to the possibility of represent-
ing the effects of assessment biases or of high multiple
family assessment ratios, these variables capture other
significant neighborhood characteristics, which are not
measured as well by other independent variables. An
indication that this may in fact be the case is the remark-
able strength shown by the structure size variable.1 The
t-statistic and elasticity of the structure size variable
are considerably above those of the other significant vari-
ables, Although this does not necessarily prove that the
variable is explaining a variety offactors, it does suggest
the possibility. In an effort to test this possibility, the
structure size variable is excluded from the estimation
process. If structure size is in fact picking up the
influence of factors represented by other independent vari-
ables, then these variables will perhaps enter significantly
when the structure size variable is excluded.
The results of estimation without the structure size
variable, shown by equation (3.4), indicate that the ab-
sence of structure size substantially alters the estimated
model. Three new independent variables enter significantly:
1The simple correlation between structure size and
the dependent variable is .58.
Italian density, single-family density, and residential
density.. One variable, lot size, is no longer signifi-
cant. Also, the estimated. coefficients of two: variables,
the density of deteriorated and dilapidated housing and
the market value of single-family properties, are greatly
disturbed. The coefficient of the former is about 50%
larger than before, and the sign of the latter coefficient
is changed from negative to positive. Moreover, the
coefficient of multiple correlation of regression (3.4)
is considerably below that of regression (3.1).
The increase in the size of the estimated coeffi-
cient of the deteriorated and dilapidated housing variable
probably indicates that some of the variation in assess-
ment-to-market value ratios due to this variable is ex-
plained by variations in structure size. The simple
correlation between structure size and deteriorated and
dilapidated housing is .302. This positive correlation
is probably caused by newer single-family structures which
have been built since the War and which are probably still
in good condition and are not as tall as older structures.
Also, older and taller single-family structures are more
likely than not to be located in areas which have under-
gone a general decline in housing quality.
The unexpected change in the sign of the market
value regression coefficient is difficult to interpret.
One explanation, however, can be based on the positive
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relationship between structure size and market value.1
Perhaps) the partial correlation which is estimated .for
market value in equation (3.4) is positive because taller
buildings are higher priced. Thus, it is a structure size
effect which may actually be causing the result.
The absence of the lot size variable in the regres-
sionmay also contribute to this result. Although the lot
size variable is not excluded from the estimation process,
it is not significant in equation (3.4). Like the structure
size variable, it is positively related to market value.2
Therefore, higher priced properties may be assessed at high
ratios not only because their buildings tend to be taller,
but also because their lots tend to be larger.
The insignificance of the lot size variable when the
structure size variable is excluded probably occurs because
of the tendency for tall structures to be associated with
small lots and vice versa. 3 In order for lot size to show
its positive effect on assessment-to-market value ratios,
structure size must be held constant. Otherwise, the lot
size effect is cancelled out by the structure size effect.
1The simple correlation between structure size and
market value is .296.
2The simple correlation between lot size and market
value is .24.8.
3The simple correlation between structure size and
lot size is -.511.
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Assessment-to-market value ratios are higher to the extent
that properties have 'large. lots but lower to the extent
that large lots usually have 'small structures. If the two
effects are not separated, the' net result is an insigni-
ficant relationship between lot size and the dependent
variable.
Further evidence that the structure size variable is
representing more than a structure size effect alone is the
appearance in equation (3.4) of three new variables. One
of these variables, single family structure density, is
highly significant and enters the equation negatively. In
C.l.b. of this chapter three reasons are suggested for ex-
pecting this negative relationship. The most likely ex-
planation is the influence of multiple family properties
on single-family assessment-to-market value ratios because
the multiple family effect is probably one of the sources
of variation which the absent structure size variable
explains. Thus, when structure size is omitted from the
regression, single-family density may tend to pick up this
effect. Of course, it is also possible that structure
size is related to the other factors which cause a negative
relationship between single-family density and the depen-
dent variable.1
The other factors suggested in V.C.l.b. are the
political influence related to single-family density and
the' 'fact that. many "nice" neighborhoods are likely to
consist of predominantly single-family properties.
102
The second new variable in equation (3.4) is. the
areal share of residential property. It enters negatively
and is significant at abo-ut. the 88% confidence' level, It
is possible that the structure size variable is explaining
variation due to the political effect which may be attri-
buted to this variable.
The entrance into equation (3.4) of the Italian
density variable is somewhat unexpected. The partial
correlation coefficient which is estimated for this
variable is negative and is significant at the 95% confi-
dence level. This change is probably caused by the fact
that the average structure and lot size in Italian areas
is less than the citywide average although this result may
also be demonstrating another example of the structure size
variable standing in for an associated neighborhood char-
acteristic. Another explanation for the existence of an
independent Italian effect is based on political pressures.
However, if political pressures of this type do exist, one
would also expect the Irish variable to show some signifi-
cant influence on assessment-to-market value ratios, which
it does not.
Equation (3.5) shows the results of estimation when
family income is substituted for market value and structure
size is excluded. In general, these results are consistent
with those in equation (3.4). The argument which explains
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the change in the sign of the market value. variable in
equation (3.4) also explains the insignificance of the
income variable in equation (3.5). The one new variable
which enters equation (3.5). very significantly, Irish
density, contradicts the argument of the above paragraph
which discounts the importance of ethnic political pres-
sure in the assessment process.
In summary, the structure size variable seems to
have two roles in the assessment behavior model. It ex-
plains variations in assessment-to-sales ratios which are
caused by variations in specific property characteristics and
by neighborhood characteristics with which it is associated.
It is unlikely that structure size is only a proxy for
neighborhood characteristics because coefficients of
multiple correlation of regressions without structure size,
but with several substitutes, are substantially lower than
those with structure size.
Although lot size does not enter equation (3.1) as
significantly as structure size, it may also be performing
somewhat the same function in the model as structure size.
Therefore, the model is also estimated excluding the lot
size variable. Equations (3.6) and (3.7) show the results
of estimation with. first the market value variable and then
the income variable.
As equations (3.6) and (3.7) indicate, the omission
of the lot size variable does not disturb the results with
respect to other independent variables nearly as much as the
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omission of structure size. Moreover, the total explana-
tion is only slightly reduced in comparison. The changes
in the results which do occur are of the same general
nature as the changes caused by the exclusion of structure
size. The decline in the size and significance of the
market value and family income coefficients is consistent
with the explanation given for the change in the sign of
the market value coefficient in equation (3.4). Also, the
same argument which explains the insignificance of the lot
size variable in equations (3.4) and (3.5) applies to the
decline in the magnitude of the structure size coefficients
in equations (3.6) and (3.7). The presence in equation
(3.6) of the structure age variable, which is not very
significant, is probably due to the tendency for newer
structures to be built on larger lots than older structures.
The Italian density variable which enters equation (3.7)
is also rather insignificant. It is probably due to the
same factors which explain the significance of the Italian
density variable in equations (3.4) and (3.5).1 When both
structure and lot size are omitted from the estimation pro-
cess, the results are identical to those shown by equation
(3.4) and (3.5).
Further Examination of the Effects of Racial Composition
There are at least two interesting aspects of the
1Part of the explanation given in connection with
equations (3.4) and (3.5) is that the average lot size is
generally smaller in Italian neighborhoods.
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composition effect which warrant investigation. First, it
is possible that the type of Negro effect which is observed
is a threshold effect i.e., a certain minimum Negro den-
sity must be reached before assessment ratios increase.
In areas where this minimum density is passed, assessment
ratios are reasonably constant with respect to variations
in Negro densities. In order to test for the existence
of a threshold effect, a dummy variable is substituted for
the Negro density variable in the assessment behavior model
Thus, the performance of the Negro dummy variable can be
compared to that of the Negro density variable. Of course,
the likelihood of any substantial difference in the per-
formance of these two variables is small because Negro
areas are rather concentrated. Therefore, the Negro den-
sity variable already displays considerable discontinuity
over its range.
A second interesting aspect of the racial composi-
tion effect is the possibility that assessment behavior
is somehow different within the Negro community from what
it is in the rest of the city. By first dividing the
sample between predominantly white and non-white neighbor-
hoods and then estimating the assessment behavior model
based on each sample, this possibility can be examined.
For purposes of dividing the sample and creating a
dummy variable, observations are classified according to
their Negro densities. Fourteen observations are included
in the Negro sample. Each one has a Negro density of over
10%, and the entire gr.oup has an average Negro density of
43%. The remainder of the city, consisting of 72 obser-
vations, has a Negro density of less than 1%. One of the
two dummy variables, Dl, is based on this division between
white and non-white neighborhoods. The other dummy vari-
able, D2, is based on a more restrictive Negro density
definition. Only eight observations with Negro densities
in excess of 30% are considered to be Negro observations.
The average Negro density in this group is 64% as opposed
to 2% in the rest of the city.
As equations (4.1) and (4.2) show, the regressions
using the dummy variables are generally consistent with
equation (3.1). Both dummies perform rather well, espe-
cially the most restricted dummy, D2, which is significant
at the 99% confidence level. Moreover, the coefficient
of multiple correlation of equation (4.2) is almost as high
as that of equation (3.1). Thus, it seems that the Negro
effect on assessment-to-market value ratios can be almost
as well characterized as a threshold-type relationship as
it can be as a continuous relationship.
There is, however, some evidence in equations (4.1)
and (4.2) which suggests that the "gradual" component of
the Negro effect is at least partially absorbed by other
independent variables. For instance, the emergence in
equations (4.1) and (4.2). of a significant Irish density
1For those observations which are classified as Negro
observations, the dummy variable equals 1; for all other
observations, it equals zero.
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variable is probably the result of this variable's rather
strong negative correlation with Negro density. 1 ' Also, in
almost every case the size and significance of the regres-
sion coefficients which are estimated in equations (4.1) and
(4.2) are greater than those of equation (3.1l),
Further evidence that some kind of gradual Negro
effect exists can be seen by comparing the coefficients
of Dl and D2. As the average Negro density of the dummy
observations is reduced, the dummy coefficient is also
reduced, i.e., D2 is greater than Dl.
In addition to suggesting that the Negro effect is
rather discontinuous, equations (4.1) and (4.2) provide a
direct estimate of the average positive assessment ratio
differential which is imposed on Negro areas, ceteris
paribus. For example, the 10.27 estimate of the D2 coeffi-
cient indicates that, ceteris paribus, assessment ratios in
Negro areas are about 10 percentage points greater than in
other areas. Of course, 10.27 is only part of the total
average assessment ratio differential which exists between
the white and non-white observations. The eight observa-
tions which are represented by D2 exhibit an average assess-
ment-to-sales ratio of 64%. The average ratio for the other
76 observations is 37%. Thus, the average difference be-
tween these white and non-white assessment ratios is 27
1The simple correlation between Negro density and
Irish density is -.49.
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percentage points.- Other. factors which contribute -sub-
stantially to this total differential are in, their order
of importance: the relatively low rate of inflation in
Negro areas, the existence of generally taller .structures
in Negro areas than in other areas, and the above average
density of deteriorated and dilapidated dwellings in
Negro areas,
The regression results which are based on the white
and non-white samples are shown by equations (4.3) and
(4.4) respectively. The results of equation (4.3) indicate
that the explanation of assessment ratio variation in white
neighborhoods is only slightly different from that in the
city as a whole. The sign pattern among the independent
variables in equation (4.3) is exactly the same as that of
equation (3.1) with the exception of the additional signi-
ficant variable, single-family structure density. Evident-
ly, single-family structure density represents factors
which significantly affect assessment ratios within white
1Estimates of the percentage contribution of each
variable to the total 27 percentage point Negro differen-
tial can be made as follows. The percentage contribution
of the Negro effect is simply the coefficient of D2 as a
per cent. of 27 percentage points, or 37%. For the other
variables, theirsabsolute contributions are found by
multiplying their regression coefficients by the differ-
ences of their white and non-white means. Then, each of
these absolute estimates is taken as a per cent of 27.
Based on equation (4.2), these calculations yield the
following.percentage contributions: price change, 23%; struc-
ture size, 15%; density of deteriorated and dilapidated
housing, .13%; and market value of single-family dwelling
5%.
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areas but not in the city as a whole. Also, its. influence
is' made more likely by the somewhat greater* variability of
single-family structure density over the white observations
as compared to all of the' observations.
Another more general difference between equations
(3.1) and (4.3) is that the' independent variables in
equation (4.3) have less impact on assessment ratio varia-
tion. Not only do they as a group explain a smaller
proportion of the total variation in the dependent vari-
able, but each individual variable which enters both
equations (3.1) and (4.3) displays a smaller and less
significant coefficient in equation (4.3). This phenomenon
may be due to the fact that many of the extreme observations
of the dependent and independent variables are excluded
from the white sample.
The estimation of the assessment behavior model based
on the non-white sample is not very satisfactory. The
standard error of the regression, which is 9.99, is con-
siderably above that of any of the other regressions.
Moreover, the F-statistic does not indicate as high a level
of significance as in other regressions.2. Although the R2
is rather high, this is to be expected with so few degrees
The standard deviation of single-family structure
density is .187 for the white observations and .177 for
the' city as a whole.
2An F-statistic of 5.82 with (5,8) degrees of free'-
dom indicates 'that a significant association exists.between
the dependent and independent variables at about the 97%
confidence level.
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of freedom. The lack of degrees of freedom also restricts
the number of independent variables which can be tested at
one time. Equation (4,4) shows the greatest number of
significant variables which can be included without
severely reducing the F-statistic of the regression.
The interpretation of the results with respect to individ-
ual variables is made difficult by the high collinearity
which exists among all the variables except the Negro
density variable.
Although the coefficient of the Negro variable is
significant at only the 85% level of confidence, it is
worth noting that the size of the coefficient is not sub-
stantially smaller than it is in equation (3.1). This
suggests that even within the Negro community,variations
in Negro densities have a considerable impact on variations
in assessment ratios. This result may, however, still be
consistent with a threshold effect. The boundaries of the
Negro community may cut across census tract observations.
If they do, then census tract averages in these areas would
tend to create the impression in the regression results of
a gradual effect.
The insignificance of the price change variable is
understandable given that average price increases in Negro
1With 8 degrees of freedom, a t-statistic of 1.40
indicates an 80%. level of confidence.
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areas were very small compared to those in the rest of the
city. 1
The sizeably larger estimate of the structure size
coefficient in (4.4) compared to (3.1) may indicate that
the effect of multiple family dwellings is much more im-
portant in Negro areas. In III.D., the description of the
Negro sample shows that it contains a disproportionately
large number of multiple family dwellings.
Because of the high collinearity which exists among
the lot size, market value, and deteriorated and dilapidated
housing variables, the results with respect to all three
variables are questionable. Although the signs of the
coefficients of the lot size and market value variables are
consistent with those of equation (3.1), the sign of the
deteriorated and dilapidated housing variable is changed.
The collinearity problem probably causes this change in
sign. When lot size and market value are excluded from the
regression, the coefficient of deteriorated and dilapidated
housing is positive.
In summary, assessment behavior in white areas of the
city seems to be about the same as assessment behavior which
is indicated by the citywide regressions. On the other hand,
the estimated results for Negro areas are not good enough to
support a general judgment one way or the other.
As noted earlier, the average price increase in
Negro areas over the ten years between 1950 and 1960 was 9%.
In the rest of the city it was over 40%.
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A Further Test of the Transaction Frequency Effect
To review briefly, the multiplicative variable
(transaction frequency times percentage price change)
in the assessment behavior model described by equation
(IV.7) provided a test of the transaction frequency effect.
The coefficient of the multiplicative term, 6l, was sup-
posed to estimate the positive effect of transaction
frequency on the length of the assessment lag. Although
the estimated coefficient of the multiplicative term was
positive, as expected, the coefficient was not significant.
The purpose of the present undertaking is to per-
form a different test on the transaction frequency effect.
If transaction frequency is related to assessment ratios
through its positive effect on assessment lags, then it
ought to be positively related to assessment ratios in areas
where prices have increased and negatively related to assess-
ment ratios in areas where prices have decreased. For
example, if there are two areas with equivalent rates of
property value inflation, the area which has the highest
rate of property turnover will presumably have the highest
average assessment-to-market value ratio, ceteris paribus.
With higher turnover rates, the assessment lag is supposedly
shorter., and the actual assessment ratio is closer to the
desired ratio which is above the actual ratio in areas of
rising prices.
Because of the way price change is defined, the
assessment lag is a negative number. Thus, a "positive
effect" means that the absolute size of the assessment lag
is reduced by an increase in transaction frequency.
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In order to perform this test of the transaction
frequency effect, the sample must, of course3 be divided
between areas of rising prices and areas of declining
prices. The assessment behavior model with a transaction
frequency variable replacing the multiplicative term is
then estimated with each of the samples. The results of
this estimation are shown in Table 5.
As in the case of the previous test, them results
are not very satisfactory. Because there are only seven
observations of declining prices, an adequate test of the
negative effect is impossible. Moreover, the transaction
frequency variable is insignificant when the sample of
rising prices is used. Nevertheless, the results of Table
5 do offer some support for the possibility of a transaction
frequency effect. For instance, based on the decreasing
price sample, equation (5.1) shows that the transaction
frequency variable is highly significant and negative.
Although the model which is estimated by regression (5.1)
does not compare well to regression (3.1), the negative
coefficient on the transaction frequency variable is nega-
tive as expected. In the rising price regression, equation
(5.2), the insignificant transaction frequency variable is
entered in order to show that it does have a positive sign.
This result is also consistent with the hypothesis.
Considering the results of Table 5 and the earlier
results of the multiplicative variable, there is no strong
evidence of a transaction frequency effect. However, the
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possibility that such an effect does exist cannot be ruled
out because the limited results are consistent with the
hypothesized effect.
4. Estimation of Neighborhood Assessment-To-Market
Value Ratios: Other Property Types
In the preceding section, a model of assessment
behavior was used to explain variations in assessment-to-
market value ratios on single-family properties. This same
model also should be able to explain neighborhood assess-
ment ratio variation within other types of property. None
of the assessment behavior hypotheses are unique to single-
family properties. Thus, in this section the same model,
equation (IV.7) is tested against three other classifica-
tions of residential property: two-family, three family,
and four-family-and-over. 1
In the investigation of assessment behavior, the
major emphasis is on the results obtained from single-family
data because of several disadvantages to using data on the
other property types. First, the sample sizes for the
other property types are all smaller and therefore probably
less representative than the single-family sample. Secondly,
there is probably considerably more heterogeneity with re-
spect to the characteristics of properties within the other
samples, especially the sample of properties with four
Because of the relative scarcity of transactions of
dwelling units which house four or more families, all of
these types are lumped together.
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families and over.'
Table 6 shows the results of estimation based on
the three different multiple family property types: equa-
tion (6.1), two-family properties; equation (6.2), three-
family properties; and equation (6.3), properties with
four families and over. All the independent variables
have the same definition as before. The transaction fre-
quencyvariable is not tested because of the lack of data
on the total number of properties of each of the three
types within each census tract.
The results of Table 6 are not discussed in great
detail. Instead, the estimated models are compared in a
general way to the estimated single-family model. The
discussion focuses on the similarities and differences among
the models. Because of the lower quality of multiple family
data, especially that of the four-family-and-over sample,
the results of Table 6 must be considered somewhat less
reliable than those based on single-family data.
The assessment lag hypothesis is very well supported
by the regressions shown in Table 6. All of the estimated
partial correlation coefficients of the price change variable
are negative. The estimated price change coefficients in
equations (6.1) and (6.2) are significant at the 99% level
1The four-family-and-over classification includes




of confidence, and the price change. coefficient in equation
(6.3) is significant ,at the 95% level of confidence.
The results.. with respect. to the' Negro density vari-
able are also consistent with those of the single-family
model, except for equation (6.3). In equations (6.1) and
(6.2) the regression coefficient of the Negro density vari-
able is positive and significant at about the 98% level of
confidence. In equation (6.3) the Negro density variable
does not enter significantly. This lack of significance of
the Negro density variable in the four-family-and-over re-
gression would not merit much consideration were it not for
the fact that this particular sample contains by far the
highest average Negro density of all the samples. The
average Negro density of each of the other samples is about
8% while the average Negro density in the four-family-and-
over sample is more than 16%. Under these circumstances,
one would expect the probability of observing a significant
Negro density variable to be greater in the four-family-and-
over regression than in any of the others. Thus, with
respect to the Negro effect, the results of equation (6.3)
provide what must be considered a significant exception to
what is observed in all of the other regressions.
Like the Negro density variable, the market value
variable enters two of the three multiple family regressions
significantly and with a sign which is consistent with the
single-family results., In the case of the market value
variable, however, it is the two-family regression which is
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the exception. Market value enters negatively in both
equations (6.2) and (6.3). The market value coefficient
is of very high significance in equation (6.2) but of much
lower significance in equation (6.3).
One of the two possible causes of the insignificance
of market value in equation (6.1) is the relatively small
variance of market value in the two-family sample.1  A
second possible cause is collinearity between market value
and the density of deteriorated and dilapidated housing.
Not only is the simple correlation between these two vari-
ables high, but also, if the deteriorated and dilapidated
housing variable is excluded from the regression, market
value does enter negatively and highly significantly. 2
Thus, it is possible that there is also a market value
effect in the two-family sample but that it is not observa-
ble due to collinearity.
From the regressions of Table 6, only in (6.2) does
the lot size variable have a significant positive relation-
ship to the dependent variable as in the single-family
estimation. Although lot size is rot significant in equa-
tion (6.1), it does enter positively. Its very low signifi-
cance in equation (6.1) may be due to the relatively small
amount of variation of two-family lot sizes compared to that
1The coefficient of variation (standard deviation
divided by the mean) of market value is smaller in the two-
family sample than in any of the other samples although it
is only slightly smaller than that of the three-family sample.
2The simple correlation between market value and
density of deteriorated and dilipidated housing is .68.
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of other property types. The lack of significance of lot
size in equation (6,3) may be. due to the great heterogeneity
of the four-family-and-over sample. For example, the data
on lot sizes for this property classification frequently
include garage areas and parking lots. Given the rather
small number of four-family-and-over observations in each
census tract, one observation of an especially large apart-
ment property could greatly influence the census tract
averages. Such an observation could affect not only the
average census tract lot sizes but also the average of
structure sizes., market values and assessments.
In equations (6.1) and (6.2) structure size enters
significantly and positively as it does in the single-family
model. The inconsistent result of equation (6.3), where the
estimated partial correlation coefficient is negative,
probably reflects the phenomenon noted in V.A.. Table 2 of
V.A. shows that the 1960 average assessment ratio for dwell-
ings containing eight families or more is markedly below
that of the other property types. Since this group of
properties is heavily weighted within the four-family-and-
over sample and buildings containing eight or more families
are generally tall buildings, a negative sign on the struc-
ture size variable in equation (6.3) is not unexpected,
1The coefficient of variation of the lot size vari-
able is lower in the two-family sample than in any other
sample.
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The results wilth respect to. the density of dete-
riorated and dilapidated housing are fairly consistent with
those of the single-family model. This variable enters
positively and significantly in equations (6..1) and (6.2).
Only in equation (6.3) is the density of deteriorated and
dilapidated housing insignificant although it does enter
with a positive sign. It appears that for the four-family-
and-over sample two other housing condition variables,
density of housing units with 1.01 or more persons per
room and the density of old structures, are replacements
for the density of deteriorated and dilapidated housing.
When these two other housing condition variables are ex-
cluded from the regression, the density of deteriorated and
dilapidated housing becomes significant and positive.
The density of single-family property does not
enter the single-family model significantly except when the
white sample is used or when the structure size variable is
omitted from the regression. However, in equation (6.2)
the density of single-family property is a significant
variable, at the 80% level of confidence, and its sign is
negative. Within the three-family property class, a nega-
tive sign on this variable could reflect the results of
political pressure if it is assumed that single-family
property owners are successful in not only influencing
their own assessments but also those of other property
types in the same neighborhood. A more likely explanation
of the negative relationship between single-family property
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density and the dependent. variable is that it is further
evidence' of the negative 'relationship between "nice"
neighborhoods and assessment-to-market. value ratios.
The significance of the Irish and Italian density
variables in equations (6.2). and (6.3)' suggests that with
respect to the properties with 'three families or more there
is an ethnic effect on assessment ratios. Although these
two variables are generally insignificant in the other two
samples, they always enter negatively. Perhaps, the
greater variation of both variables in the three-family
and four-family-and-more samples causes these variables
to enter more significantly.
The negative partial correlation coefficients esti-
mated in equations (6.1) and (6.2) for the density of
housing units with 1.01 or more persons per room are diffi-
cult to explain. The expected signs are positive and in
fact, the simple correlations between this variable and the
dependent variables are positive.1 A possible explanation
is that in these property classes crowded housing, ceteris
paribus, means high property values, and thus this variable
may be picking up a market value related effect.
In summary, although much of the preceding discus-
sion is concerned with the differences between the results
The simple correlation between the dependent vari-
able and the density .of housing units with 1.01. or more
persons per room is '.32 in. .the' two-family sample and .41
in the' three-family sample.
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of multiple family estimation and single-family estimation,
the existence of general consistency betw.een the estimated
results is not denied'. The results of single-family and
multiple family estimation demonstrate many of the same
relationships between assessment-to-market value ratios
and the independent variables. For instance, the price
change variable is negatively related to assessment ratios.
The Negro variable, poor housing conditions. variable, and
structure size variable are all positively related to
assessment ratios. There is also evidence of a negative
relationship between market value and the assessment-to-
market value ratios although this evidence is not as clear
as that for the other variables. Even though the lot size
variable lacks significance in all but one equation, its
results do not contradict the single-family results.
D. Individual Property Model
Most of the hypotheses of Chapter II are directed
at explaining variations in neighborhood assessment-to-
market value ratios. However, not all of the neighborhood
variation is necessarily caused by assessment behavior
which is associated only with neighborhood characteristics.
In fact, the discussion in Chapter II suggests several
aspects of assessment behavior which may be a function of
individual property assessment decisions as opposed to
neighborhood assessment decisions. In order to investigate
individual property assessment behavior, an individual
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property assessment behavior model is estimated. This
model was developed in IV.C., and its final formulation
is reproduced below:
t n. 12
where (at /pt)ij is the assessment-to-market value ratio
on the jth individual property in the ith neighborhood;
(At t i is the average ratio in the ith neighborhood;
(n /N represents characteristic 1 as the ratio of that
characteristic for the jth individual property in the ith
neighborhood to the average of that characteristic in the
ith neighborhood, etc., The estimation of the above is
based on observations of single-family property character-
istics.
1. Variables of the Model
Ideally, in this model one would like to test each
of the variables used in the neighborhood model. Unfortu-
nately, this is not possible. Only three independent vari-
ables are available on an individual property basis. A
discussion of the expected relationship of each variable to
the dependent variable accompanies the description of each
of these three variables, which is given below.
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Structure' Size' and Lot Size
The discussion of V.C.l.b4 presents several reasons
for expecting variations in neighborhood assessment ratios
to be associated with variations in the average structure
and lot sizes of neighborhoods. One reason is that with
respect to individual properties there may be systematic
errors in assessments due to the improper weighting of
structure and lot size characteristics in the assessment
process. The results of tests of these variables in the
neighborhood model show that both variables are significant
and positively related to assessment-to-market value ratios.
What the neighborhood results do not show, however, is
whether or not these positive relationships are due to
systematic assessment errors made on individual properties
or to relevant neighborhood characteristics which are
associated with these variables. Systematic assessment
errors can cause a positive or a negative effect. The
associated neighborhood characteristics suggest positive
relationships. Thus, the observed positive relationships
are consistent with both effects. The testing of both
these variables in the individual property model should
help to determine whether or not there are systematic
assessment errors, and if there are, what their effects
are on assessment-to-market value ratios. For example, if
on an individual property basis the results indicate a
negative relationship between structure size and assessment-
to-market value ratios, then the observed positive neighbor-
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hood relationship must be due to neighborhood factors.
Market Value
There are two reasons to expect market value to be
a significant variable in the individual property model.
First, the discussion of assessment behavior in II.A.
suggests that the benefit principle may influence individual
property assessment decisions. The hypothesis holds that
within any given neighborhood the assessor may assume that
benefits are evenly distributed and therefore attempt to
equalize tax burdens with respect to total tax bills. To
the extent that this is true., market value ought to be
negatively related to individual assessment-to-market value
ratios within neighborhoods.
The existence of an assessment lag effect is a
second reason to expect market value to be negatively re-
lated to assessment-to-market value ratios. Since there
is no price change variable in the individual property
model, the market value variable will tend to pick up the
assessment lag effect. The likelihood of this actually
occurring is very great considering the strong evidence
of an assessment lag effect which is revealed by the
neighborhood model.
2. A Problem in Estimation
The sampling method used in gathering data creates
an estimation problem with regard to the individual prop-
erty model. As previously indicated, a random sample of
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data was not collected.. Instead, .in the later. of two
collection periods only those properties which turned
over during the period between 1959 and 1961 we're sampled.
Thus, the proportion of properties sampled in each part of
the city is not necessarily equal. Areas with higher
turnover rates are represented by a disproportionately
large number of observations. Consequently, regression
results based on this unevenly weighted sample will be
biased in a direction which reflects the experience of
properties in the more heavily weighted areas.
A possible solution to this problem is to delete
at random observations from those areas which are weighted
too heavily. A likely goal in a deletion process would be
to make the number of observations in each area proportion-
al to the number of properties of a particular type within
the area. A regression using this reduced sample would be
more likely to reflect the experience of a typical property.
No weighting correction, however, is made in this
study. A precise estimation of regression coefficients is
A similar,.though less important, weighting problem
exists with regard to the neighborhood model to the extent
that census tracts containing residential property with an
insufficient number of property transaction observations
were excluded from the sample. However, attempts were made
to minimize the number of such census tracts by undertaking
more intensive sampling in areas with relatively infrequent
transactions. The fact that the number of recorded trans-
actions in each census tract is not equal is unimportant
because the purpose of the neighborhood model is to explain
variations among regions and not among typical individual
properties in different regions.
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not particularly important for the. purposes of this study.
It is considered unlikely that the biases are great enough
to either alter, the signs of the coefficients..- or to signi-
ficantly change the identification of significant variables.
3. Estimation of Single-Family Individual Property
Assessment-To-Market Value Ratios
Given the specific variables which are to be tested
in the individual property model, equation (IV.8) can be
rewritten as,
t t i i 1 i
For individual properties (at/t).. is the assessment-to-
sale value ratio, p is the market value, 1 is the lot
size, and s is the structure size. The corresponding
capitalized symbols are the neighborhood averages. Equa-
tion (v.4) is estimated with a data sample which is consi-
derably greater than that of the neighborhood model.
Whereas the neighborhood model uses observations on single-
family properties from 86 different areas, this model uses
observations on 1922 properties within the same total
area.
The first three regression equations in Table 7 are
estimates of equation (V.4 ). The equations differ only with
respect to the samples used in estimation, Equation (7.1)
is based on the total sample, and equations (7.2) and (7.3)
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are based on observations from predominantly white and non-
white neighborhoods respectively - The dividing line between
the last two samples -is drawn at exactly the same point as
in the neighborhood model. There are1777 white. observations
and 145 non-white observations.
The entries in Table 7 for the first three regres-
sions are slightly different from those of other regressions.
Because the means of all the variables in the first three
equations are equal to one, their elasticities and regres-
sion coefficients are equivalent. Thus, only one entry is
made for each variable. Moreover, although the variables
in the first three equations are all ratios, the elasticity
of the numerator of the dependent variable with respect to
the numerator of any independent variable is also equal to
the coefficient which is entered in Table 7.1
1The elasticity of (a t ij with respect to (n )
is defined as (n ) /(at t ij x a(at /t ij/a(n ) . In
this case where the relationship is
(A t 0 1 N
and(atpt) ij tt
and a n 1 . =..Y (N
the elasticity, E(a/p,n 1 ), is written
E(a/p,n) = Y At/ Pt) t1 N i ~ (at/P.t)ij
If E(a/p,n 1) is evaluated at the point of the means,
(At t i/(at tij ~1,and (n /(N ) 1. Therefore,1, an i i1
E(a/p,nl) = .l' The ratios of the means are not exactly
equal to one because each neighborhood does not contain
the same number of observations.
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The regression results of Table 7 indicate thab the
statistical tests for all of the equations are highly signi-
ficant. The t-statistic on each variable is significant
at the .01 level, and the F-statistic of each regression
is significant above the .01 level.
The regression results of Table 7 also indicate that
the independent variables of the individual property model
explain a rather low proportion of the total variation in
deviations of individual property assessment ratios from
the average assessment ratio in each neighborhood. Equa-
tion (7.4) is a neighborhood model regression with the same
three independent variables, although not in ratio form,
that are used in the individual property model. The coeffi-
cient of multiple correlation of equation (7.4) is over
three times as large as that of equation (7.1). However,
this difference in the proportion of variance explained is
to be expected. The individual property model is attempting
to explain variations in assessment ratios on individual
properties within neighborhoods. No attempt is made to
explain the variations among individual properties in
different neighborhoods.
There are at least two reasons for the large propor-
tion of unexplained intra-neighborhood variation, and these
reasons need not be mutually exclusive. First of all, the
three explanatory variables used in the regression provide a
rather incomplete physical description of a piece of proper-
ty. For example, besides the lot size and the number of
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stories in a structure, ,the total floor space and the num-
ber of rooms are probably important. There may also be a
distinction made beltween owner-occupied and renter-occu-
pied properties. Secondly, measurement errors, imperfec-
tions in the residential housing market, and non-systematic
assessment errors probably cause considerable noise in this
model.
Market Value
As expected, equation (7.1) shows that the estimated
partial correlation coefficient between market value and the
dependent variable is highly significant and negative. More-
over, the elasticity of the market value variable in equa-
tion (7.1), -. 428, is about the same size as that estimated
by the comparable neighborhood model, equation (7.4),
-.398. This similarity of elasticities suggests that the
cause of the market value discrimination is fundamentally
an individual property phenomenon. If there were important
neighborhood effects with respect to .price discrimination,
one would expect the neighborhood elasticity to be larger
than the individual property elasticity.
Thus, the market value effect which is observed in
the neighborhood model may only be reflecting an individual
property. phenomenon. As stated earlier, there are two possi-
ble causes of the individual property effect: assessment lags
and the application of a benefit principle. The fact that
in the neighborhood model assessment lags are taken into
account by the price change variable and the market value
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variable is still significant and negative suggests that
the cause of this negative. effect in the neighborhood model
is the application of an individual property benefit prin-
ciple.
Because the above argument is based on the similar-
ity between elasticity estimates, it should not be given
very high significance. The estimated coefficients of the
individual property model in particular are of questionable
accuracy because of the weighting problem which was dis-
cussed earlier. Given the possible margin of error, these
results may still be consistent with the existence of both
an individual property and a neighborhood market value
effect.
Structure Size and Lot Size
Both the lot size and the structure size variables
are significant in equation (7.1), and they both enter the
regression with the same positive signs as in the neighbor-
hood model. These results suggest rather strongly that
systematic assessment errors are made in connection with
these two individual property characteristics. Furthermore,
it seems very likely that these individual property effects
are reflected in the results of the neighborhood model.
A comparison of the estimated elasticities of lot
size and structure size of the individual property model with
the neighborhood model indicates that the neighborhood
structure size elasticity is substantially larger. This
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implies that structure size in the neighborhood model is
explaining more than just the systematic assessment errors of
individual properties'. This implied result is fully con-
sistent with the evidence gained from the investigation of
the neighborhood model which suggests that the neighborhood
structure size variable is standing in for several important
neighborhood characteristics.
A Comparis-on BetWeen White and Non-White Areas
In general, the results of Table 7 indicate that
assessment behavior with respect to individual properties
is about the same in both white and non-white areas. When
the sample is divided between white and non-white areas,
the estimations of the individual property model, equations
(7.2) and (7.3), do not show much variation. All three
variables are highly significant in both cases, and the
sign patterns are the same.
The relative magnitudes of the estimated structure
size coefficients are the only source of substantial varia-
tion between equations (7.2) and (7.3). The larger non-
white estimate shown in equation (7.3) is consistent with
the relatively larger structure size coefficient which is
estimated by the non-white neighborhood model. In both
cases it is difficult to understand why this occurs. Per-
haps, the assessor simply overestimates the contribution of
structure size to market value to a greater extent in non-
white areas than in white areas.
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E. Another Test
The empirical results obtained from testing the
assessment behavior model developed in this study leaves
an important issue unresolved. From the results it is
not possible to distinguish between two of the broad
types of explanation for assessment ratio variation which
have been suggested: deliberate use of neighborhood
characteristics to achieve policy objectives and inadver-
tent mis-estimation of market value by failure to take
neighborhood characteristics into account. Since the
results are consistent with both explanations, it is not
possible to reject either hypothesis.
There is, however, one further test which may
help to disentangle these two hypotheses. Suppose that
assessment ratio variation is caused solely by errors in
estimating market value resulting from giving exclusive
attention to individual property characteristics and
neglecting neighborhood influences on market value. If
this were the case, then the level of assessment (the
numerator of the assessment-to-market value ratio) is
determined only by individual property characteristics.
Thus, if a regression of the assessment level variable
on the independent variables of the neighborhood model
indicates that individual property characteristic vari-
ables are significant and neighborhood variables are
insignificant, then the hypothesis that there is a
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deliberately discriminatory assessment policy according
to neighborhood characteristics can be rejected. On the
other hand, if both individual property and neighborhood
variables are significant, this hypothesis cannot be
rejected.
Unfortunately, the ability of this test to reject
the deliberate discrimination hypothesis, even if it is
correct, is diminished by the fact that the neighborhood
characteristics are, of course, correlated with market
value. Therefore, they are likely to be significant even
if they do not enter into the assessor's calculation. In
addition, the results will be confused by the possibility
that the two individual property variables, structure and
lot size, may themselves reflect important neighborhood
characteristics. Nevertheless, although it is unlikely
that this test will yield any new information, it is
undertaken because it does have the potential power to
reject one of the two hypotheses.
The equation which is tested with single-family
property data is written
(V.5) (At) = 60 + 6 1N1 + 6 2N2 + .
where the Nts are most of the same variables which are
tested in the neighborhood assessment ratio model. The
dependent variable, At, is 1960 average single-family
assessment. The observational units are census tracts.
Two of the N's, single-family structure and lot size,
are individual property variables. The rest of the N's
are neighborhood variables: Negro density, Italian den-
sity, Irish density, density of deteriorated and
dilapidated housing units, density of single-family
housing units, density of housing units built before 1939,
and density of housing units with 1.01 or more persons
per room. The market value of single-family properties
is not included as an independent variable because it
clearly represents both individual property and neighbor-
hood characteristics. It would certainly be highly
significant in a regression of equation (V.5) even if
none of the neighborhood variables were significant, its
presence in the regression would not allow a rejection
of the deliberate discrimination hypothesis. Because of
the high correlation of median family income with market
value, it is also excluded from the regression.
Regression results are shown in Table 8, and, as
equation (8.1) indicates, all variables are significant.
Both individual property characteristics and neighborhood
characteristics have a significant effect upon assessment
levels. Given the relatively high fraction of the total
variance in assessment levels which equation (8.1)
explains (R2 = .74), these results are simply additional
evidence that a deliberately discriminatory assessment
policy is being followed and/or assessors are inadver-
tently mis-estimating market value.
CHAPTER VI
Intertemporal Study
The preceding discussion has been almost exclu-
sively devoted to an examination of assessment behavior
at one point in time, 1960. This chapter focuses on
changes over time in both assessment behavior and
effective tax rate patterns. The specific time period
examined is 1950 to 1960.
The 1950 to 1960 time period is particularly in-
teresting because it is marked by greatly increased demands
on Boston's property tax resources. Total property tax
revenue rose during these 10 years by approximately 64%.
Per capita tax levies jumped from $112 to $212. Although
the nominal tax rate rose from $63 to $100 per one thou-
sand dollars of assessed valuation, the effective tax
rate increases were somewhat less severe. The general
decline in assessment-to-market value ratios partially
offset the steep nominal tax rate increase. The net
result of the nominal tax increase and the assessment
ratio decreases were effective tax rate increases of
3.3% to 4.0% on single-family properties, 3.6% to 4.1%
on two-family properties, 4.3% to 5.1% on three-family
II
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properties, and 5.6% to 6.4% on four-family-and-over
properties.
As stated above, two different aspects of assess-
ment practices are investigated in this section. First,
1950 assessment behavior is analyzed and compared to re-
sults of the preceding investigation of 1960 assessment
behavior. The purpose of such a comparison is to deter-
mine whether or not any discernable changes in assessment
behavior occurred over the 1950 to 1960 period. Second,
the 1960 cross-sectional distribution of effective tax
rates is compared to the 1950 cross-sectional distribu-
tion. The purpose of this second part of the investiga-
tion is primarily descriptive. The intertemporal compar-
isons are made in order to reveal changes in the conse-
quences of assessment practices rather than to identify
fundamental changes in assessment behavior.
A. Assessment Behavior Comparison
The method of investigating 1950 assessment be-
havior is almost exactly the same as that used in Chapter
V to examine 1960 assessment behavior. The assessment
behavior model which is developed in Chapter IV is esti-
mated by ordinary least squares using a 1950 cross-section
of single-family property data. The relationship which
is estimated is reproduced below:
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(IV.7) (At /Pt) = 0 AP + 1 F AP + a0 + a1N + a2N2 + ... .
Both the 1950 and 1960 estimations of the above equation
are presented in Table 9, by (9.1) and (9.2) respectively.
The 1960 estimation of (IV.7) was, of course, presented
earlier by regression (3.1), however, it is repeated in
Table 9 in order to facilitate the 1950-1960 comparison.
Also, regression (9.2) is based on a sample size of 86
while regression (9.1) uses only 81 observations. Five
1950 observations had to be dropped because 1940 estimates
of market value are not available for them.1
A comparison of regressions (9.1) and (9.2) in-
dicates that there are both similarities and differences
between 1950 and 1960 assessment behavior. Although
price change is a significant negative influence on assess-
ment ratios in 1950 as well as in 1960, the absolutely
larger 1950 price change coefficient suggests tha the
assessment mechanism responded more quickly to price
changes which occurred between 1940 and 1950 than it did
to price changes which occurred between 1950 and 1960.2
1The 1940 estimates of market value are necessary
in order to generate the AP/P variable.
2A zero value for the coefficient of AP/P indi-
cates perfect adjustment. The speed of adjustment is




The magnitudes and signs of the structure size, lot size,
and market value variables are roughly consistent between
the 1950 and 1960 regressions.
On the other hand, the racial effect and the
effect of deteriorated and dilapidated housing, both of
which are very important in 1960, are not significant in
1950. Also, the significance of the Irish density vari-
able in equation (9.1), although it is not very highly
significant, suggests the existence of an Irish ethnic ef-
fect in 1950. For single-family property estimation in
1960, the Irish density variable is significant only under
a few special conditions.1 Notice that in these instances
where the explanation differs the most there have been
relatively large differences in the mean values of the
variables. This suggests that the changes in the quan-
titative importance of these variables over time may have
caused a change in assessment behavior with respect to
these variables. Such a reaction is certainly possible,
especially in the case of the Negro, and deteriorated and
dilapidated housing variables.
There also is one overall difference between equa-
tions (9.1) and (9.2). A greater proportion of the total
variation in single-family assessment-to-market value
1The single-family regressions in which the Irish
density variable enters significantly are (3.5), (4.1),
and (4.2).
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ratios is explained in 1960 than in 1950. This occurs
even though there is substantially more variation in the
1960 ratios than in the 1950 ratios.1 This relatively
low 1950 R 2 suggests that there may be an important as-
pect of assessment behavior in 1950 which is not repre-
sented by the independent variables included in the model.
In addition to this possibility, it is also possible that
assessors estimated market value more precisely in the
earlier period by responding more accurately to neighbor-
hood externalities. Evidence that the speed of response
to price changes was faster in the earlier period tends to
support this explanation because it indicates that in the
earlier period market value was a relatively more impor-
tant determinant of assessments. Moreover, to the extent
that intentional discrimination was a less important force
in the assessment process in the earlier period, the
neighborhood variables would also be expected to explain
a smaller proportion of the observed variation.
B. Comparison of the Effects of Assessment Practices
The preceding comparison of 1950 to 1960 assess-
ment behavior suggests that there probably are some im-
portant differences between the 1950 and 1960 distribu-
tions of effective tax rates. The purpose of the present
1The coefficient of variation of assessment-to-
market value ratios in 1960 is .32; in 1950 it is .18.
I.
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section is to determine how the characteristics of neigh-
borhoods with differentially high or low effective tax
rates have changed between 1950 and 1960. An attempt is
made to describe the differences between 1950 and 1960
effective tax rate distributions with respect to several
interesting neighborhood characteristics: racial and
ethnic composition, general housing conditions, and median
family income.1  By using ordinary least squares regression
analysis, the partial correlation coefficients between the
variables representing neighborhood characteristics and
effective tax rates can be estimated.
One way to compare the effective tax rate distri-
bution of 1950 to that of 1960 is to attempt to explain
the variations in assessment-to-market value ratios in
both 1950 and 1960 by variations in neighborhood charac-
teristics. Thus, the following equation is estimated
with 1950 and 1960 census tract data:
(VI.1) At /t = a0 + a 1N1 + a2N 2 +
The dependent variable is single-family assessment-to-
market value ratios. The independent variables represent
five neighborhood characteristics: Negro density, Irish
density, Italian density, density of deteriorated and
1The price change variable is omitted from the
regression because no attempt is made to explain why the
rates vary but simply to describe how they vary,
I -
dilapidated housing, and median family income. Observa-
tional units are census tracts, and the sample size is
exactly the same as that used in the estimation of the
assessment behavior model.
The 1950 and 1960 estimations of equation (VI.1)
are shown by equations (9.3) and (9.4) respectively. The
sign pattern of the independent variables in (9.3) and
(9.4) indicates that in both 1950 and 1960 Negro neighbor-
hoods are likely to have differentially high effective tax
rates and that Irish and Italian neighborhoods are likely
to have differentially low effective tax rates. In addi-
tion, effective tax rates are negatively related to
median family income in both periods.
There also are at least two interesting differ-
ences between regressions (9.3) and (9.4). First, the
estimated partial correlation coefficient and the elas-
ticity of the Negro density variable are considerably
smaller in the 1950 regression. Moreover, the t-statistic
of the Negro density variable is much lower in 1950 com-
pared to 1960. Secondly, a comparison between 1950 and
1960 of the Italian and Irish variables shows that the
extent of preferred tax treatment of Italian and Irish
neighborhoods has declined. Thirdly, the estimated coef-
ficient of the housing condition variable in 1950 is not
only barely significant, but its sign is different from
what it is in the 1960 regression. Thus, it appears from
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these results that between 1950 and 1960 there probably
was an increase in effective tax rate discrimination
against Negro neighborhoods and against neighborhoods with
relatively poor housing conditions, and a decrease in
effective tax rate discrimination in favor of Italian and
Irish neighborhoods.
A more direct method of describing possible changes
in the distribution of effective tax rates is to measure
the changes in effective tax rates in each neighborhood
and to explain the variation in these changes by variations
in neighborhood characteristics. In order to measure ef-
fective tax rate change, the percentage deviation of each
observation's assessment-to-market value ratio from the
mean assessment-to-market value ratio of these two devia-
tions is calculated for 1950 and 1960. The difference
of these two deviations is used as a measure of the 1950-
1960 change in the relationship of each observation's
effective tax rate to the mean effective tax rate of the
sample. For example, if a particular observation has an
1Ati
(A/P)5 (A/P)L5 A ) 6- (A/)6  x 100,(A/P) 5 (A/P)6 
-__
where At is the value of the dependent variable for the
ith observation, (A/P) i5 and (A/P)i6 are the effective tax
rates for the ith observation in 1950 and 1960 respec-
tively, and (A/P) 5 and (A7F) 6 are the mean effective tax
rates in 1950 and 1960 respectively.
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effective tax rate which is 10% below the mean in 1950 and
30% below the mean in 1960, the measure of effective tax
rate change would equal +20%, i.e., there would be a 20
percentage point improvement for the observation in terms
of the relationship of its tax rate to the mean tax rate.
In order to determine how changes in effective tax
rates are distributed, the following equation is estimated:
(VI.2) At =0 + * 1 N1 + * 2N 2 + .. *
where At is the measure of effective tax rate change and
the N's are the same collection of variables described in
connection with equation (VI.1).
Equation (9 .5) shows the results of the estima-
tion of equation (VI.2). Both the Negro density and the
housing condition variables are highly significant in
regression (9.5). Their negative signs indicate that in
Negro areas and in areas of poor housing conditions effec-
tive tax rates tended to move upward with respect to the
mean tax rate of the sample. Such a result is consistent
with the implications of the comparison of regressions
(9.3) and (9.4) and provides further evidence that the
change in assessment behavior which is observed during
the 1950's caused definite changes in the incidence of
1Elasticities are not calculated for this regres-
sionbecause the mean of the dependent variable is about
equal to zero.
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effective tax rates with respect to certain population and
housing characteristics.
One factor which may have contributed to the ob-
served change in the distribution of effective tax rates
is, of course, a change in relative cross-sectional neigh-
borhood assessment levels. A way to test the influence
of this factor is to attempt to estimate how the effective
tax rate would have been distributed in 1960 if assessment
levels had not changed during the 1950 to 1960 period.
The relationship which is estimated is written as,
(VI.3) (A5 P6) = 0 + 1 N1 + q2N2 + ... .
Since the numerator of the dependent variable of this
equation is the 1950 assessment level and the denominator
is the 1960 level of market value, the dependent variable
is the effective tax rate which would have existed in
1960 if, with prices changing, assessments had remained
unchanged at their 1950 levels. The estimated partial
correlation coefficients show how the hypothetical pattern
of effective tax rates would have been distributed.
The estimation of (VI.3) is shown by equation
(9.6). The considerably smaller estimate of the Negro
density coefficient in (9.6) compared to (9.3) indicates
that effective tax rate discrimination against Negro
areas would have been less severe if the assessor had
simply maintained the 1950 assessment levels through
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1960. This result is also consistent with the other
results of this section which show a marked increase
in the degree of effective tax rate discrimination against
Negro areas during the 1950's.
CHAPTER VII
Summary of Findings and Conclusions
The purpose of this study is to describe the
pattern of effective residential property tax rate varia-
tion in the City of Boston and to attempt to determine
possible causes of the observed pattern. Important find-
ings related to each of these two objectives are summariz-
ed below in A. and B.. These summaries are followed by a
discussion of some general conclusions and then a policy
suggestion.
A. The Nature of Effective Property Tax Rate Variation
With respect to the overall nature of effective
rate variation, it is clear that the variation is system-
atic. Although a random element must also contribute to
the variation, there is very convincing evidence of many
different kinds of substantial systematic variation.
Effective tax rate variation according to differ-
ent types of property is perhaps the most obvious kind of
variation. Both 1950 and 1960 data indicate that
effective tax rates tend to increase with the number of
families occupying any given structure. For instance,
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in 1960 as the number of families per structure increases,
the assessment-to-market' value ratio progressively
increases to over 80% the size of the assessment-to-market
value ratio on single-family properties. This variation
by property type is observed not only in the city as a
whole but also within individual census tracts with only
a few insignificant exceptions.
What limited data there are on properties with
newly constructed buildings suggest that these properties
are likely to be assessed at a higher fraction of market
value than other residential properties occupied by the
same number of families. In 1960 newly constructed
single-family properties had assessment-to-market value
ratios which were on the average about 15% - 20% higher
than other single-family properties. However, it should
be emphasized that the sample of new construction is
unsatisfactory in several respects.
The remainder of the findings relevant to describ-
ing the nature of effective rate variation are produced
by regression analysis. The primary purpose of most of
the regression analysis is to identify the causes of
effective tax variation. A few other regressions are
performed for the sole purpose of obtaining information
about the nature of effective rate variation. The results
from the first group of regressions also provide useful
information about the nature of the variation, and they are
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summarized in the following pages. The additional
information gained from the second group of regressions
is summarized in the last part of this section.
Regression results clearly indicate that there
is a highly significant relationship between the average
rate of neighborhood property value inflation and effec-
tive tax rates. The relationship is a negative one, and
it is observed in all the tests involving data from each
of the property type classifications. It is estimated
that if there had been no change in property values
between 1950 and 1960, assessment ratios on single-
family properties in 1960 would have averaged about 18%
greater than they did.1 Findings from 1950 data indicate
the same kind of relationship between the rate of property
value inflation and effective tax rates although the
extent of the discrimination against neighborhoods with
relatively less rapid rates of property value inflation
was probably somewhat less severe in 1950.
Effective tax rate discrimination against neigh-
borhoods with relative high Negro population densities
is clearly evident. Assessment ratios on single-family
1This does not imply that effective tax rates
would also have been 18% higher in 1960 because rises
in nominal tax rates would certainly have been less
than they were. It is unlikely that the 1960 average
city-wide effective tax rate under conditions of perfect
assessment adjustment would have been much different
from what it actually was in 1960.
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properties in neighborhoods with the highest Negro popu-
lation densities are on the average 27 percentage points,
or over 70%, greater than in the rest of the city. Within
the framework of a regression equation, it is estimated
that about 17 percentage points of the total 27 percentage
point spread is accounted for by certain characteristics
of high density Negro areas which are associated with
differentially high assessment-to-market value ratios in
the rest of the city. Nevertheless, ceteris paribus,
about 10 percentage points of the total spread appears to
be related only to neighborhood racial composition. Data
on two-family and three-family properties display this
same general result. The one significant exception to
these findings is produced by the four-family-and-over
sample in which Negro densities are not found to be signi-
ficantly related to effective tax rates. Although
limited tests of 1950 data also fail to reveal a signifi-
cant relation between assessment ratios and Negro densities,
this is not necessarily inconsistent with the 1960
findings. Instead, the 1950 finding suggests that
effective tax rate discrimination against Negro neighbor-
hoods may be a relatively new phenomenon.
Findings on other population characteristics,
Italian and Irish densities, are rather inconclusive.
Although there is some evidence of a negative relation-
ship between these two characteristics and effective tax
II
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rates, in all but one regression the statistical signifi-
cance of the relationship is very low.
Another kind of effective tax rate variation is
indicated by the regression results on three rather highly
correlated neighborhood characteristics: mean family
income, density of deteriorated and dilapidated housing
units, and average property market value. Properties in
neighborhoods which have relatively high densities of
deteriorated and dilapidated dwellings, or low family
incomes, or low property market values tend to be assessed
at higher fractions of market value than properties in
other areas. Moreover, to the extent that neighborhoods
exhibit more than one of these three characteristics,
which is fairly common, effective tax rate discrimination
against them is even greater. These general findings are
supported by the results of every regression based on both
1950 and 1960 data.
Effective property tax rates also appear to vary
with respect to somewhat more specific neighborhood
property characteristics: average structure size and
average lot size. Ceteris paribus, as the average size
of buildings increases and/or the average size of lots
increases, assessment ratios tend to increase. Almost
all of the regression results are consistent with this




Finally, there are several neighborhood character-
istic variables which do not appear to be significant in
the regression tests of the assessment behavior model.
These variables represent housing unit age, the degree of
crowding within housing units, single-family structure
density and areal share, and the frequency of property
transactions. Some evidence does suggest, however, that
transaction frequency may be positively related to assess-
ment ratios, i.e., properties in neighborhoods with rising
property values and high average transaction frequencies
tend to be assessed at higher fractions of market value
than properties in neighborhoods with the same rate of price
inflation but lower average transaction frequencies.
The previous findings on the nature of effective
rate variation are produced by various tests of the assess-
ment behavior model. Findings from a second group of regres-
sions aimed solely at describing the nature of effective rate
variation are generally consistent with the previous
findings. However, this second group of regressions does
yield some additional information. First they provide
1Because the purpose of these regressions is to
identify interesting population and housing characteristics
associated with assessment-to-market value ratios, no
attempt is made to account for variations due to dynamic
characteristics. Therefore, the price change variable,
AP/P, is excluded from these regressions.
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somewhat stronger.evidence of a negative, ceteris paribus,
relation between both. Italian and Irish densities and
effective tax rates. Moreover, the findings indicate that
the extent of preferential effective tax rate treatment in
Italian and Irish neighborhoods declined between 1950 and
1960 while effective tax rate discrimination against Negro
neighborhoods increased. Results also show that if the
assessor had frozen assessments at 1950 levels, the extent
of effective tax rate discrimination against Negro neigh-
borhoods would have been less than it was in 1960. In
addition, effective tax rates are found to discriminate to
a greater extent against neighborhoods with high densities
of deteriorated and dilapidated housing in 1960 than in
1950.
B. Causes of Effective Property Tax Rate Variation
We turn now to the findings which are relevant to
the question of what causes the observed pattern of effec-
tive tax rate variation. In Chapter II three broad types
of explanation are offered: deliberate use of assessments
to achieve certain policy goals; inadvertent but systema-
tic mis-estimation of market value; and failure to keep
assessments up-to-date with changing market values. In
the discussion which follows, findings relating to each of
these types of explanation are summarized.
There is substantial evidence that the existence
of lags in the assessment process is an important cause
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of effective tax rate variation. The coefficient of the
variable repre-senting. the rate of inflation is negative and
highly significant in regressions based on each property
type classification of 1960 data and on 1950 single-family
property data. In addition, evidence that properties with
new construction tend to be assessed at differentially high
fractions of market value also supports the assessment lag
explanation. Although the findings on a transaction
frequency effect are not very significant, they are con-
sistent with this explanation. A comparison of the
influence of inflation rates on assessment ratios in 1950
and 1960 indicates that the speed of assessment adjustment
to price changes was probably faster in 1950 than in 1960.
Results also support the hypothesis that effective
tax rates are deliberately discriminatory. Moreover, the
findings do not rule out any of the several objectives of
a discriminatory policy suggested in Chapter II. Again,
these objectives are: application of a type of benefit
principle; the minimization of political pressure; and the
pursuit of certain social goals.
The observed neighborhood effective tax rate
discrimination against multiple-family dwellings in
neighborhoods with relatively poor housing conditions, low
median family income, and low average property market
value is what would be expected if a benefit principle of
assessment is in fact employed, i.e., if assessments are
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designed so that tax collections reflect the city's cost
of providing public services to each neighborhood. In
addition, tests of the individual property model suggest
that a slightly different type of benefit principle may
cause the observed market value discrimination among
individual properties.
The importance of political factors in the assess-
ment process is implied by the apparent ceteris paribus
discrimination against predominantly Negro neighborhoods.
This is well substantiated by almost every test of the
assessment behavior model. Although the favorable tax
treatments of Italian and Irish neighborhoods is of a
very low level of significance, this is consistent with
the existence of an assessment system which is vulnerable
to political pressures.
Most of the findings which are consistent with
either of the above two objectives of a deliberately dis-
criminatory assessment policy are also consistent with the
third possible objective, the pursuit of certain social
goals. The observed Negro neighborhood effect may in part
be caused by an effort to maintain a "desirable" racial
balance. Both competition with suburbia for middle-to-
1This kind of modified benefit principle results
from the assessor's presumption that benefits from public
expenditures are about the same for neighboring properties,
and, therefore, tax bills (assessed valuations) ought to
be similar.
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upper income residents by allowing effective tax rates to
fall in middle-to-upper income neighborhoods and/or dis-
couragement of the physical deterioration of any "nice"
neighborhood by means of favorable tax treatment can
explain the general type of effective tax rate variation
described above.
Like the other two broad types of explanations,
a practice of unintentional systematic mis-estimation of
market value can also explain much of the observed pattern
of effective tax rate variation. If the assessor fails to
take into account positive or negative influences on market
value created by certain characteristics of the neighbor-
hood in which the property is located, then one would ex-
pect to find the differentially high tax rates which are
observed in low income neighborhoods containing very low
quality housing of low market value.
Systematic assessment errors may also be made by
improper weighting of individual property characteristics
in the assessor's calculation of market value. With
respect to this possibility, the findings show that
properties with taller structures and/or larger lots tend
to be assessed at differentially high fractions of market
value. Such a result does not necessarily reflect
incorrect value weighting with regard to these character-
istics. Given the large impact which these two highly
significant variables have on assessment-to-market value
156
ratios, especially t.he structure size variable, it is very
likely that they are representing neighborhood character-
istics correlated with these individual property character-
istics. Another possibility is that the assessment ratio
variation by property type influences assessment ratios on
properties of the same type and that the structure size and
lot size variables are to some extent explaining this
effect.1
C. Some General Conclusions
Although the findings of this study clearly identify
assessment lags as an important cause of inequalities in
effective property tax rates, the findings also indicate
that assessment lags explain only part of the total varia-
tion. Another important part of the total variation is
explained by either or both of two hypotheses: inadvertent
mis-estimation of market value and intentional tax rate
discrimination according to certain policy goals. However,
because the same general group of results support both
hypotheses, it is impossible to determine to what extent
either or both hypotheses are correct.
For example, single-family properties may be
assessed at higher fractions of market value when they
are located among multiple-family properties which are
generally assessed at higher fractions of market value
than single-family properties; greater average neighbor-
hood structure size would probably indicate such a
situation.
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Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe that the
large amount of variation in effective tax rates which has
persisted over at least a ten-year period is attributable
only to the existence of assessment lags and the mis-
estimation of market value. These two explanations areC similar in that they are based on a failure to achieve a
desired goal of non-discriminating assessment according to
market value. It is unrealistic to conclude that failures
of such large magnitude would be allowed to persist for as
long as ten years. In short, some part of the total
variation must be attributable to an assessment policy of
deliberate tax discrimination; otherwise, one is left with
an implausible conclusion.
Also related to the evidence of persistent, system-
atic tax rate variation is the question of why the public
has not pressed for greater tax rate uniformity. Either
taxpayers are ignorant of the prevailing pattern of
effective tax rates and of the magnitude of some of the
tax rate differentials, or they are not motivated to com-
plain effectively about the situation. In fact, both of
these factors are probably partially responsible for the
lack of interest in property tax reform. Assessment ratio
lFor example, data on the most homogeneous prop-
erty type, single-family.properties, show that in 1960
the mean ratio of assessed value to market value was .40,
the standard deviation was .13, the highest ratio was .80
and the lowest ratio was .23.
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information of the type presented in this study has never
been published. Although some taxpayers must have know-
ledge of individual cases of assessment ratio inequality,
they are not likely to be aware of the widespread and
systematic nature of the inequalities.
However, even if some idea of the nature of the
inequalities were generally known, taxpayers may fear that
change from status 2uo will raise their property tax bills.
Since most taxpayers realize that their property is con-
siderably underassessed in relation to its market value, it
is possible that the differential between assessed valua-
tion and market value is viewed as a potential source of
increased taxation. In other words, although equalization
of effective tax rates would create tax reductions equiva-
lent to tax increases, taxpayers who are uncertain about
their own prospects for gain or loss are likely to be
reluctant to promote tax rate uniformity; their fear of
increased tax liability is not offset by their chance of
reduction.
Oldman and Aaron did publish similar though less
detailed, statistics in 1963 which is after the period of
time spanned by this study. It is interesting to note
that their findings did not generate any noticeable
agitation for reforms.
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D. A Policy Suggestion
The results :show that with respect to residential
property in Boston actual assessment practices virtually
ignore the clear intent of property tax law. Given what
is generally considered to be ac.ceptable performance for
other types of taxes, the extensive divergence from the
legal requirement of effective tax rate uniformity is
intolerable. In view of this obvious shortcoming of the
existing assessment system, a fundamental change in overall
assessment policy is needed. It is suggested that an
effective effort to assess properties at the best estimate
of their current market value would greatly improve the
quality of assessment administration, i.e., reduce varia-
tion in effective tax rates.
Ideally, a change to current market value assess-
ment would not only reduce the variation in effective tax
rates but also would require any deliberate effective tax
rate discrimination to be determined openly. The more or
less secretive process by which assessment-to-market value
ratios are now established would be abolished because the
act of assessing would be clearly aimed only at the goal
1For a discussion of legal requirements, see:
"Inequalities in Property Tax Assessments: New Cures for
Old Ill," Harvard Law Review, Vol. LXXV, May, 1962, p. 1376.
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of current market. value assessment. Any variations in
effective. tax rates which are deemed to be desirable, e.g.,
variations according to property type, housing conditions,
etc., would have to be determined in the same way that
nominal tax rates now are. Thus, variations established
by a legislative process would be clearly evident to
taxpayers.
Under the proposed current market value assessment
process, some errors in assessments would be unavoidable.
Current market value can only be estimated, except in cases
where recent transactions have occurred. If sales data
were frequently examined for evidence of new trends in
market value and past assessment errors and if assessments
were adjusted as quickly as possible to new market value
estimates, errors in current market value appraisals would
be minimized. Moreover, the establishment of a tax
abatement mechanism readily available and well-known to all
taxpayers would generate another source of information on
the accuracy of existing assessments.
This study does not attempt to evaluate how well
such a system would perform. Such an estimate would require
information about the trade-off between improved assessment
quality and the costs of assessment administration. In
general, assessment administration cost is considered to
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be low. 1 However, regardless of what the actual costs are,
within the present. assessment administration budget, per-
formance would certainly be improved simply by substituting
the goal of current market value assessment for the factors
which now influence assessments. Admittedly, accurate
current market value assessments are not made any easier
by the small fraction of properties which turn over each
year. For instance, in Boston not more than 6% of all
single-family properties are bought and sold each year. 2
Moreover, the problems of substantial heterogeneity and
low turnover associated with current market assessment of
commercial and industrial properties are even greater than
3for residential properties. Only by examination of the
procedures and organization of the assessment system itself
is it possible to determine whether or not the property
tax can be administered reasonably well at a moderate cost.
1Dick Netzer, Economics of the Property Tax, pp.
174-175. In the City of Milwaukee where assessment
quality is relatively high (The variance of assessment-
to-market value ratios is low.), property tax administra-
tion costs are about 1.5% of total annual property tax
revenue.
U. S. Bureau of Census, Census of Governments:
1967, Vol. 2, "Taxable Property Values," Table 19.
3In Boston commercial and industrial properties
accounted for 55% of the gross assessed value in 1966.
Residential properties accounted for 41%. Ibid., Table
19.
APPENDIX A
Tables of Regression Results
Key to Table 3
AP/P) Percentage average price change for single-family
properties
N) Negro density
S) Average structure size for single-family properties
(stories)
L) Average lot size for single-family properties
(square feet)
D) Density of deteriorated and dilapidated housing
units
P) Average market value for single-family properties
Y) Median family income
SFD) Density of single-family housing units
RD) Areal share of residential land use
A) Density of structures built before 1939




TI) Transaction frequency term (AP/P x transaction
frequency for single family properties)
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The dependent variable is single-family assessment-
to-market value ratios.
Key to Table 4
Dl) Dummy variable for Negro census tracts with more
than 10% Negro population
D2) Dummy variable for Negro census tracts with more
than 30% Negro population
All other variables are defined as in Table 3.
Key to Table 5
T2) Transaction frequency for single-family properties
All other variables are defined as in Table 3.
Key to Table 6
Variables AP/P, S, L, and P are redefined for two-
family properties in equation (6.1), for three-family
properties in (6.2), and for four-family-and-over proper-
ties in (6.3).
All other variables are defined as in Table 3.
Key to Table 7
p..) Market value of individual single-family properties
1 j) Lot size of individual single-family properties
s..) Structure size of individual single-familya)
properties
Pi) Same as P in Table 3
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L.) Same as L in Table 3
Si) Same as S in Table 3
The dependent variable in regressions (7.1) - (7.3)
is the ratio of individual property assessment ratios to
census tract assessment ratios. The dependent variable
in regression (7.4) is the same as in Table 3.
Key to Table 8
The dependent variable is the level of assessed
valuation on single-family properties. All other variables
are defined as in Table 3.
Key to Table 9
The independent variables are defined as in Table
3 where the subscripts, 5 and 6, refer to 1950 and 1960
measurements of the variables. The dependent variables in
regression (9.5), At, is defined in footnote 1 , page 142.





Indep. 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 Indep.
Var. Var.
Constant 14.89 24.27 20.54 47.22 53.28 28.70 32.99
( 3.14) ( 4.29) ( 3.33) (10.36) (14.61) ( 5.48) ( 5.61)
AP/P -. 200 -. 208 -. 208 - .252 - .247 -. 189 -. 197
[- .179] [- .186] [- .186] [- .224] [- .220] [- .169] [- .176] 35.39
(-4.93) (-5.18) (-5.04) (-5.37) (-5.25) (-4.43) (-4.76)
N .198 .183 .228 .240 .211 .236 .216
[ .039] [ .036] [ .044] [ .047] [ .041] [ .046] [ .042] 7.72( 4.82) ( 4.36) ( 5.77) ( 4.96) ( 3.56) ( 5.81) (-5.15)
S 7.043 6.00 8.08 5.62 4.70[ .695] [ .593] [ .800] - - [ .556] [ .470] 3.92( 6.51) ( 7.27) ( 7.31) ( 5.72) ( 6.16)
L .116 .098 .110
[ .128] [ .108] [ .121] - 43.69
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3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 Indep.
Indp. Var.
P- .343 .550 .241 .183
[- .106] -- - .171] [ .116] - [- .569] - 12.37
(- 2.01) (- 3.55) ( 1.46.) (-1.10)
Y - .143 - .124
[- .216] * [- .187] 59.95
(-2.07) - (-1.72)
SFD - .106 - .097
* . * * [- .056] [- .051] * * 21.0
(-2.5.1) (-2.25)
RD- .068 - .072
* * * [..- .070] [- .073] * * 40.3
(-1.60) (-1.66)
A .055 - .063
* * [- .126] * * [- .145] * 91.5
(- 1.01) (-1.12)
PR* * * * * * *
8.03
IT - .167 - .252
[- .032] [- .049] 7.6
(-1.94) (-2.82)
Table 3.
W6 L, zi -
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Table 3. (continued)
86 for all regressions.
Equation Mean~
Indep. 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 Indep.
Var . Var.
IR * * * * -. 153 * *[- .0461 11.8
(-1.09)
T * * * * * * * .945
R2 (F-stat.) .81 .81 .80 .74 .74 .79 .80
(56.9) (57.1) (54.2) (32.2) (31.7) (51.2) (52.4)
Mean Dep. Var.
(Std. Error Est.) 39.6 39.6 39.6 39.6 39.6 39.6 39.6
( 5.67) (5.67) ( 5.78) ( 6.68) ( 6.72) ( 5.92) ( 5.86)
Now All 11 111111 loll, L A I 1111 , All
1 Total observations:




quations Mean Mean Mean
4.1 4.2 Indep. 4.3 Indep. 4.4 Indep.
Ine Var. Var Var.
Constant 14.52 14.47 19.92 32.57
2.79) 2.90) 4.42) ( 1.06)
AP/P - .199 - .201 35.39 - .169 40.58 8.71







7.43 [ .132]( 1.63)
S 7.71 7.63 3.92 5.80 3.83 17.05 4.42
[ .765] [ .755] [ .561] [ 1.270]
( 6.86) ( 7.07) ( 5.80) ( 2.96)
01
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Table 4. (continued)
Equations Mean Mean Mean
Indep. ~ 4.1 4.2 Indep. 4.3 Indep. 4.4 Indep.Inep-Var .Var.. Var .
Var.
L .145 .135 43.69 .o84 44.37 .429 40.20
[ .161] [ .148] [ .104] [ .303]
( 3.41) ( 3.33) ( 2.55) l47)
D .101 .113 19.01 .053 13.57 - .414 47.0
[ .048] [ .054] [ .020] [- .326]
( 1.95) ( 2.38) ( 1.22) (-1.15)
P - .442 - .423 12.37 - .216 13.04 -6.06 8.93
[- .138] [- .132] [- .081] [- .912]
(-2.40) (-2,39) (-1.53.) (-2.61)
Y 59.95 61.32 45.90
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(continued)
Equations Mean Mean Mean
4.1 4.2 Indep. 4.3 Indep. 4.4 Indep.




IR - .171 - .125
[- .051] [- .040] *
(- 1.57) (- 1.19) 11.8
Observations 86 86 72 14
R2 (F-stat.) .79 .81 .62 .78
( 42.8) (47.2) (17.8) ( 5.83)
Mean Dep. Var.
(Std.Error Est.) 39.6 39.6 35.8 59.5
( 5.99) ( 5.76) ( 4.36) ( 9.99)
_-- -------- - A A iii I It- 111. j&Liijijj1mjjj da
Table 4.





5.1 Indep. 5.2 Indep.
Indep . Var. . Var.
Var.
Constant - 25.2 15.92
( - 3.38.) ( 3.65)
AP/P - 12.17 - .128 39.6
[- .137]
(- 2.69)
N 40.00 .161 4.87
[ .021]
(- .3.75)
S 14.13 4.77 6.06 3.85
[ .968] [ .631]
( 11.20) ( 6.18)
L 1.03 31.47 .085 44.77
[ .465] [ .103]
( 8.69) ( 2.35)
D 55.67 .083 15.8
[ .035]
( 1.90)




5.1 Indep 5.2 Indep.
Indep. . Var. Var.
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(continued)
Equation 6.1 Mean 6.2 Mean 647 Mean
(Two- Indep. (Three- Indep. (Four- Indep.
ndep Family) Var. Family) Var. Family +) Var.
Var-
p 13.87 - 1.326 12.7 - .120 36.08
*[- .327 [- .067]
[- 4.37] (-.1.46)( 4.9.7.)
Y
SFD - -063 15.6 9.8
* 21.2 - .019]
( - 1. 311)
RD * 44.0 * 42.9 33.8
A -952 97.3
* 90.96 * 92.94 [ 1644( 3.0.)
PR -. 280 8.19 - .312 9.01 1.88 7.66
[- .055] [- .055] [ .223]

















Equation 6.1 Mean 6.2 Mean 6.4 Mean
(Two- Indep. (Three- Indep. (Four- Indep.
Indep- Family) Var. Family) Var. Family +) Var.
Var ....
IR 1236 - .141 11.8 - .972 7.2[- .032] [- .109]
(- 1.33) (- 2.4,21)
Observations 79 85 40
R2 (F-stat.) .78 .80 .77
(51.6) ( 30 4) ( 15.7)
Mean Dep. Var.
(Std. Error Est.) 41.46 51.48 64.37
( 4.29) ( 4.92) 8.52)
...-.-- P ~- ~ A ~~ - - - I 4




7.1 7.2 7.3 Indep. 7.4 Indep.
Ind (Whi te.) (Non-Whit e) Var. Var.
Constant 1.15 1.14 .550 - .081
(31.97) (31.76) ( 2.28) (-1.40)
p- .428 - .417 - .628
(-17.75) (-16.87) (-6.63) 1.0
i. .186 .197 .126
( 12.80) ( 12.95) ( 2.73) 1.0
.134 .115 1.011










7.1 7.2 7.3 Indep. 7.4 Indep.





Observations 1922 1777 145 86
R2 (F-stat.) .17 .17 .29 .63
(128.9) (118.6) (19.4) (46.9)
Mean Dep. Var. 1.0 1.0 1.0 39.6
(Std. Error Est.) ( .30) ( .29) ( .35) ( 7.79)
-- mRalms"Am-11" ALI C MA1111k, 11m"-6kjUj gj- Jjjjj J6NINE Li.ill,
Table 7.




8.1 Mean Indep. 8.1 Mean
Indep. Indep. Var. (continued) Indep.
Var. Var. Var.
Constant 428 IT - .046 7.6
( .170) (- 1.91)
N - .034 7.72 IR - .126 11.8
(-2.80) (-3.77)
S 2.42 3.92 R2 .74
( 9.12) (F-stat) ( 28.19)
L .044 43.69 Mean Dep. 5.02













the other regressions based
is the level of assessments,
on census
A60 '
tract observations, the depend-
I III IMIN
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Equations 9.5 9.6 Mean
9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 (Dep. Var., (Dep.Var., Dep.
Indep. (1950) (1960) (1950) (1960) At) A5/P6 ) Var.
Var. /6
Constant 23.95 14.89 86.45 45.12 1.80 45.23
( 2.87) ( 3.14) (15.41) ( 6.474) ( .153) ( 5.05)
AP/P 5  - .108[ - .120] 62.53
(-2.17) 
~






N 6  .198 .240 - .664 .106
[ .036] [ .047) [ .028] 7.72
~ (4.36) 





Equation 9.5 9.6 Mean
9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 (Dep.Var., (Dep.Var., Dep.
Indep. (1950) (1960) (1950) (1960) At) A5/P6) Var.
Var. /6













D6 .097 .211 - .283 - .276 19.01
[ .055] [ .101] [ .138]










Equation 9.5 9.6 Mean
9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 (Dep.Var., (Dep.Var., Dep.
Indep. (1950) (1960) (1950) (1960) t) A5/P6 ) Var.
Var.
Y5 - .996 29.80
.563]
(- 6.08)
Y6- - .111 .225 - .125 59-95
[- .166] [- .198]
(- 1.15) (1.27) (-1.01)
IT5 - .730 2.56
[- .034]
1(- 2.49)
IT 6  - .261 * - .272 7.60
[- .050] [- .055]
(- 2.45) (-1.98)
IR5 - .465 .401
C- .036] [- .030] 4.03
(- 1.52) (- 1.07) ~~1~
IR6  - .230 .400 - .318
___ * [- .069] [- .099] 11.80
(- 1.47) (-1.50) (-1.58)
R .58 .81 .49 .63 .59 .47(F-stat.) (20.6) (57.1) (15.5) (27.4) (29.2) (14.4)
Mean Dep. Var. 52.0 39.6 52.6 39.6 0.01 37.9(Std.Error Est.) ( 6.28) ( 5.67) ( 7.01) ( 7.90) (14.8) (10.1)
Hmmlmm JIM WAILLA, 64A '1611. jhdwib , J'Al jJ4.1, 
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APPENDIX B
Correlation Matrix of Variables
of the Neighborhood Model
Single-Family
Variables:
1) Assessment-to-market value ratio
2) Price change
3) Negro density
4) Market value of single-family properties
5) Median family income
6) Structure size (height)
7) Lot size (square feet)
8) Density of deteriorated and dilapidated housing units
9) Density of housing units with 1.01 or more persons
per room
10) Fraction of structures built before 1939
11) Fraction of total housing units which are contained
in single-family structures
12) Density of residential land use
13) Italian density
14) Irish density




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1) 1.00
2) -. 69 1.00
3) .70 -. 50 1.00
4) -. 20 .34 -. 20 1.00
5) -. 48 .41 -. 43 .72 1.00
6) .58 -. 28 .26 .30 -. 09 1.00
7) -. 26 .29 -. 03 .25 .27 -. 51 1.00
8) -. 65 -. 53 .53 -. 52 -. 59 .30 -. 38
9) .19 -. 22 .17 -. 59 -. 59 -. 13 -. 14
10) .24 -. 14 .15 -. 12 -. 06 .39 -. 34
11) -. 30 .14 -. 16 .11 .44 -. 42 .31
12) -. 07 -. 06 .15 -. 08 .07 -. 29 .25
13) -. 28 .10 -. 23 -. 21 -. 09 -. 32 -. 14
14) -. 35 .19 -. 49 -. 11 .30 -. 22 .09
.32 -. 11 .24






10) .26 -. 31 1.00
11) -. 21 -. 20





.13 .03 -. 06 -. 10 1.00
.01 -. 02 .25 .15 -. 25 1.00
.16 .00 .25 1.00
(8) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
15) -. 40 -. 30 .01 -. 07
